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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record Nos. 1939-1940 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
versus 
COLEY H.. CARWILE, ET ALS. 
ST.A TE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
vers·u.!; 
N. N. HOLT, ET ALS. 
PETITION O:B' THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
To the Hono.1·able Justices· of the 8upre'J'ne Oou'l'·t of'.Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioners, Sidney B. Hall, E. Lee Trinkle, Joseph 
H. Saunders, Rose MacDonald, Virginius R. Shackleford, 
Robert H. Daniel, ,J. Gordon Bohannon arid Dave E. ·Satter-
; field, constituting the· State Board of Education of Virginia, 
respectfully represent unto your Honors that they are ag-
grieved· by a final judgm.ent of the Circuit Court of the City 
of Richmond, entered July 31, 1937, awarding a writ of man-
damus against said petitioners in the combined suits of Coley 
H. Carwile and others agamst the State Board of Education 
and N. N. Holt and others against the State Board of Edu-
cation. The judgment complained of required your petition-
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ers to remove the names of J. J. Fray and W: D. Cox from 
the list of persons eligible for election to the position of Di-
vision Superintendent of Schools. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
The reg11lar four-year terms of office for all Division Su-
perintendents of Schools expired in June, 1937. Within sixty 
days prior to May 1, 1937, the local school boards were to elect 
or reelect Division Superintendents for the succeeding four 
years from a list of eligibles compiled and certified to all local 
boards by the State Board of Education. 
On February 1, 1937, the State Board of Education pub-
lished its official statement of "minimum qualifications for 
the position of Division Superintendent'', as required by 
statute, "in order that an applicant for the position of Di-
vision Superintendent may know what qualifications are re-
quired of him". [Virginia Code (Michie, 1937) §649.] 
This statement set up certain formal, academic standards, 
including· the requirement of a master's degree for all new ap-
plicants, but stated that: 
"Division superintendents now in service shall be consid-
ered to have met the eligibility requirements which were in 
force at the time of the beginning of their continuous service, 
and shall not be removed from. the list of eligibles because of 
subsequent changes in eligbility requirements which may have 
been made during the period of their continuous serviceP (R., 
pp. 25-26.} 
(As will be shown in detail hereafter, the minimum qualifi-
cations for this JlOsition have always been thus stated in the 
alternative, making experience in office an independent basis 
of eligibility, ever since the first minimum qualifications were 
prescribed in 1916 by the Legislature.) 
Accordingly, the eligibility list compiled for the 1937 elec-
tions contained, among others, the names of at least fifty-
six Division Superintendents, including J. J. Fray and W. D. 
Cox, who were eligible under the published statement just 
quoted, but who did not hold the master's degree. 
On February 27, 1937, the plaintiffs below filed their re-
spective petitions for a writ or 'vrits of mandamus compelling 
the State Board of Education to remove the names of J. J. 
Frav and 1N. D. Cox from the eligibility list on the grounds 
tha£ the State Board of Education (although it admittedly 
need not have required a master's or any other degree of 
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any applicant, and although it had not intended to require 
a master's degree of incumbents whose records were· satis-
factory) had, in spite of itself, rendered ineligible all of these 
56 experienced incumbents who did not hold such degrees. The 
two suits were combined, and, by leave of the court, the said 
W. D. Cox intervened. Thereupon the cause was set down 
for hearing on the petitions and answers, resulting in the 
judgment complained of. 
Further facts may be more intelligently brought out in dis-, 
cussing the various assignments of error. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
I. 
The Circuit Court erred in accepting, as the basis for its 
decision, disputed allegations of fact contained in the peti-
tions for mandamus, and in not accepting the allegations 
contained in the answer. 
II. 
The Circuit Court erred in holding that the State Board 
of Education is not authorized and empowered by the State 
Constitution and by statute to prescribe, in the alternative,-
two or more separate and distinct standards of qualification 
for the office of Division Superintendent of Schools. 
III. 
The Circuit Court erred in holding that the State Board 
of Education did not, in fact, prescribe such alternative 
standards of qualification. 
ARGU~IENT. 
I. 
The Circuit Court erred in accepting, as the basis for its 
decision, disputed alle,gations of fact con-tained in the petitions 
for mandamttt,t;, a;nd in not acceptin,.g the a:llegations contained 
in. the answer. 
This cause was set down for hearing and was decided wholly 
on the pleadings. The record discloses that, when the de-
fendants filed their sworn answer, the plaintiffs elected and 
agreed to have the case set down for hearing on petitions 
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and answers, all of which were sworn to, according to the 
familiar practice in chancery cases (R., pp. 47-48}. 
In 'spite of this fact, the opinion of the learned trial judge 
expr~ssly adopts, as the basis of the Circuit Court's decision, 
facts alleged in the petitions and. denied by the answers ; like-
wis~,- the opinion igno_res certain vitally important matters 
alleged in the answers. 
In .support of its conclusion that the statute (Code §649} 
seems· to conte~plate a single set of "minimum qualifica-
tions", applicable alike to incumbents seeking reappointment 
and to new applicants, the Circuit Court relied largely on the 
plaintiffs' disputed allegations that the State Board of Edu-
cation had recognized this construction of the statute, and 
had accordingly notified incumbents of the new requirements 
adopted in 1931 and 1932, as to the master's degree, advising 
them to meet these- qualifications by September ·1, 1935. In 
his statement of the case, Ifis Honor said: 
"Notice o£ the two foregoing resolutions," (i. e., those 
adopting the master's degree requirements) ''was given to 
the then division superintendents of schools on the existing 
eligible list and to all applicants for the position of division 
superintendents of schools so that those who were not quali-
fied to be placed upon the eligible list would be given until 
September 1, 1935, to meet the new requirements adopted by 
the State Board of Education.'' (Opinion of Circuit Court, 
R., p. 54.) 
In, conclusion o£ his opinion, His Honor argued: 
· ''As heretofore stated, the Board gave all on the eligible 
list nearly four (4) years in which to qualify themselves to 
meet the requirements of the Board and during that period 
fifty-six superintendents failed to take advantage of that pe-
riod of time." (R., p. 58.) 
This allegations of the plaintiffs below was categorically 
denied in the answers filed, from which it further affirma-
t~vel~ ·appears that the resolutions referred to were never in-
tended to apply to incumbents, and that the notice described. 
was .sent only to applicants who were on the eligible list, but 
were not then serving as superintendents (R., pp. 20, 39). · 
Construing the statute to prohibit alternative qualifications, 
the Circuit Judg·e further·stated:· ,. ·· · 
: ·'·' • *· '"' This was recognized by the State· Board of Educa-
tion· and that construction :plac·ed ·upon. the statute by it, be-
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eause on March 30, 1932, it adopted the resolution reading 
as follows: · 
''The Board by resolution instructed State Superintendent 
~all to notify alt persons on the eligible list prior to Decem· 
ber 4, 1931, on which date the requirements for eligibility were 
revised, that they would- be given until September 1, 1935, 
to meet the new requirements adopted by the Board at the 
December, 1931, meeting." (Italics 1-Iis Honor's. R., p. 57.) 
His Honor proceeded to quote from a resolution of the 
Board: 
'' [Resolved] that the Superintendent of Public Instruction 
convey these new requirements to those already on .the eligible 
list and encourage them to take steps to meet the increased re-
quirements" (R., p. 58). · 
From this I:Iis Honor concluded: 
."This shows that the Board intended to have a fixed stand-
ard of scholastic education and training for all superintend-
ents in the Commonwealth and not to discriminate against 
any county or school division" (R., p. 58). 
This reasoning-apparently the principal ground of the 
of the Circuit Court's decision-is based on a complete mis-
conception of the facts as established by the undenied an-
swers. From the answers, it affirmatively appears that these 
''new requirements" were never intended to apply to incum-
bents; that when the Board dhected the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction to notify ''those already on the eligible 
list", it refert·ed only to those persons on the statutory list 
who came under the heading of ''Eligible Applicants for Su-
perintendencies", and not to those whose names were listed 
as "Ineumbeuts Eligible for Reappointment"; that accord-
ingly the incumbents were not notified (R., pp. 20-22, 39-41). 
In fact, as the allegations of the answers distinctly show, the 
Board has always made it perfectly clear that satisfactory 
service in office should be an independent, qualifying condi- · 
tion, the forn1al academic standards having always been in-
tended solely as credentials to be required of new and in-
experleneed applicants. The· entire opinion of the Circuit 
Court not only ignores these allegations, but is expressly 
based on the assumption that they are not true. 
It is elementary that ·when a chancery metuse is set down 
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for hearing on bill and answer, the allegations ·Of the answer 
must 1 be taken as true. 
See: 
Cocke v. ilfinor, 25 Gratt. (66 Va.) 246, 252-3. 
Goodmll!n v. Goodman, 124 Va. 579, 582, 98 S. E. 625. 
Of. Virginia Code (lVIichie, 1936), §6128: 
"TJnless a complainant in a suit in equity shall, in his bill, 
request an answer or answer under oath to certain specified 
interrogatories, the answer of the defendant, though under 
oath,! shall not be evidence in his favor, 'ltnless the cause be 
lzeard upon bill and an.~wer only; * • * . " (Italics supplied.) 
In the inst~nt case; as appears from the record, the parties 
and the court below manifestly intended to adopt this con-
venient chancery practice. No other assumption is possible in 
view of what was done : since the plaintiff~ offered no evi-
dence to prove their case, certainly they could not claim to 
have ' established the disputed allegations of their petition, 
nor could they claim to have refuted the sworn allegations 
of the answer when they neither denied them by replication 
nor offered evidence to disprove them. Furthermore, the fact· 
that W. D. Oox was perrnitted, without question, to inter-
vene by petition as a party defendant seems conclusive evi-
dence that the parties and the court intended to follow chan-
cery rules in these proceedings. 
l'V e submit that there is no reason why the intentions of 
the parties in this respect should not be given effect. It 
seems clear that the modern, informal, procedure in man-
damus cases, supplanting the technical common law method, 
is sufficiently flexible to permit such practice. In this con-
nection, we call the Court's attention to the case of Rinehart 
& Dennis Co. v. McArthu1·, 123 Va. 556, 96 S. E. 829. There 
the plaintiff below, McArthur, petitioned for n1andamus to 
con1pel the clerk of the trial court to turn over to him cer-
tain money which had been deposited by 1fcArthur 11-s security 
in a certain chancery suit; the clerk answered that McArthur 
had made an equitable assignment to the Rinehart & Dennis 
Co., and prayed that the latter be made a party and that 
his (the clerk's) answer be treated as an interpleader, which 
prayer was granted. This court did not agree that the answer 
could properly be treated as an interpleader, but said: 
'' e • • we can see no good reason, under the liberal pro-
visions of the new procedure, 'vhy he'' (the alleged assignee) 
S~te Board of Education v. C. H. Carwile, et als. ? 
'' S'uould not be admitted as a party, and the rights of the' 
parties thus speedily determined in the mandamus proceed-
ing. * ~ * " (Opinion of Burks, J., 123 Va., at p. 567.) 
. This court then proceeded to decide the case on its merits, 
recognizing the purely equitable assignment (ordinarily· not 
cognizable in a law case), and directing the clerk to pay the 
funds ~ question to the Rinehart & Dennis Co. A better il-
lustration of the flexibility of the modern procedure in man-
damus could hardly be asked. 
We submit, therefore, that the Circuit Court plainly erred 
iu accepting disputed allegations of the petitions to the ex-
clusion of defendants' allegations, and in entering judgment 
thereon. · 
II. 
The Circ·uit Court erred in holdinl} that the State Board of 
Ed~tcation is not authorized and empowered by the State Oon-· 
stitution and by statute to prescribe, in. the alternative, two 
or mo·re .~eparate and distinct standards of qualification for 
the office of Division. 8u11e.rintendent of Schools. 
The Circuit Court concluded that the State Board of Edu-
cation, in making up the list of persons eligible to appoint-
ment as Division Superintendent of Schools, is legally · re-
quired to establish a sing·le fixed standard of qualification, 
applicable alike to incumbents and to new and inexperienced 
candidates. 
The Constitution and statutory provisions involved are as 
follows: 
''The duties and powers of the State Board of Education 
shall be as follows : 
'' * * * It shall certify to the local school board or boards 
of each division in the State a list of persons having reason-
able academic and business qualifications for division super-
intendent of schools, one of whom shall be selected as the su-
perintendent of schools for such division by the said school 
board or boards, • • * . '' (Constitution of Virginia, §132.) 
"No one shall be eligible for appointment as division su-
perintendent unless he meets the minimum qualifications set 
up by the State Board of Education, and in order that an 
applicant for the position of division superintendent may 
know what qualifications are required of him, the State Board 
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of Education is hereby required to publish on the first of 
:rebruary of the year in which such election is to take place, 
a statement showing the minimum qualifications for the po_-
sition of division superintendent of schools, which statement 
shall be furnished to all applicants. The superintenden~s at 
present in office shall continue therein until their present 
terms expire . 
. ''.Within sixty days before May first, nineteen hundred and 
t.hirty-three and every four years thereafter there shall be 
appointed by the school board or boards of each school di-
vision, ·one division superintendent of schools who shall be 
selected from a list of eligibles certified by the State Board 
of Education and shall hold office for four years. • * • . '' 
(Virginia Code (lVIichie t936) §649:) 
We take the position that, under the prov1s1ons quoted, 
there· is no reason why the Board, in exercising its constitu-
tional prerogative of selecting ''persons having reasonable 
~cademic and business qualifications'', should not prescribe a 
number of separate and distinct educational standards, tak- · 
ing into account both the value of practical experience as a 
qualifying element, and the necessity for demanding special 
credentials of persons who have no record in service to show 
tP,eir qualifications. Thus, we submit that the Board might 
readily have adopted some such requirements as the follo,v-
ing:' 
No one shall be eligible for the position of Division Su-
perintendent except persons having: 
(l) Fifteen years' continuous experience as Division Su-
perintendent, with no college degree ; or 
(2) Ten years' experience as Superintendent and the B. A. 
degree; or 
(3) Ten years' experience as Superintendent and the B. S. 
degree; or . 
( 4) Five years' experience and the B. A. and L. L. B. de-
grees; or 
( 5) No experience, but the master's degree; or 
(6) No experience as Superintendent, but 5 years· actual 
business experience and the bachelor's degree. 
Many other appropriate standards might be suggested, but 
the above example is sufficient to illustrate what we conceive 
t,o be the powers of the Board. We submit that there is noth-
ing ~n the statute to prohibit, expressly or by implication, 
the ~doption of such requirements, _or to enforce the adoption· 
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of a single standard of college or other training, or a single 
standard of experience, or a single standard based on any 
combination of these. . 
To show that the Legislature did not intend that the 
standard of '·minimum qualifications'' should necessarily take 
the form of a single standard, we call particular attention 
to the' fact that the Legislature itself, in prescribin.q minimum 
qualification.~ under the old ConstituJion, has always estab-
lished tuw or more alternative requirements, and has always 
made experience in office an independent basis ~~ eligibility. 
HiSTORY OF CODE §649. 
Before the constitutional amendment of 1928, Division Su-
perintendents of Schools were appointed by the State Board 
of ~jducation, subject to confirmation by the Senate. This 
practice began 'vith the adoption of the Constitution of 1869,. 
Article VII, Section 2, and Acts 1869-70, Chapter 259, p. 402, 
establishing the first uniform system of public free schools. 
In 1916, for the first time, certain standards of training 
and experience were established by the Legislature as mini-
nlum qualifications for the }JOsition of Division Superintend-
ent, and provision was made for the establishment of cer-
tain further standards by the Board itself. These standards 
were in the alternative, and made experience in office a sepa-
rate and distinct basis of eligibility: 
'' ~ Iii * The board shall not consider for division superin-
tendent of schools any 1nan 'vho does not hold, or has not held 
a State teacher's license the equivalent of a first grade cer-
tificate, or who has not already held the office of division su-
perintendent, or who has not been a teacher for such nU'Jnber 
of yea.rs as the board 'may designate, and in order that an 
applicant for the position of division superintendent may 
know what qualifications are required of him, the State board 
of education is hereby required to publish on the first day 
of Febn1ary of the year in which said election ·is to take 
place, a statement showing the minimun1 qualifications for 
the position of division superintendent of schools, which state-
nlent shall be furnished to all applicants on request.'' (Acts 
191G, chapter 467, pp. 789-80. Italics supplied.) 
This statute was repeated by the Code of 1919, §624. 
In 1928, anticipating the constitutional amendment, the 
Legislature enacted chapter 471 of Acts 1928, pp. 1186, et seq. 
Section 649 of this act provided for appointment of new Di-
vision Superintendents in 1929 according to the old Constitu-
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tion, . and also, on the condition that the amendment should 
be adopted, provided for their election under the new sys-
tem. In either event, under this statute the Legislature 
omitted the former provision fixing some of the minimum 
qualifications for Division Superintendents, and deleg·ated the 
function of prescribing such standards to the State Board 
of Education: where the statute formerly provided "The 
board shall not consider for division superintendent of schools 
any man who does not hold'' (etc.) ''and in order that an 
applicant for the position of division superintendent may 
know", etc., it now sin1ply provided: 
" • ~{t * No one shall be eligible for appointment as division 
superintendent tmless he meets the minimum qualifications 
set up by the State board of education, and in order that an 
applicant for the position of division superintendent may 
know what qualifications are required of him, the State board 
of education is hereby required to publish on the first of Feb-
ruary of the year in which such election is to take place, a 
stat~ment showing· the minimut:n qualifications for the position 
of division superintendent of schools, which statement shall · 
be furnished to all applicants. ,. * :a • " (Acts 1928, chapter 
431, p. 1201, §649.) 
These provisions, as quoted, constitute the material por-
tion of the present statute-since the adoption of the consti-. 
tutional an1endment of 1928, the Leg·islature has tnerely 
omitted the provisions allowing for a constitutional change. 
Acts 1930, chapter 412, p. 883, §649; Virginia Code (Michie 
1936) §649. {There have been certain other amendments to 
other portions of this section, all irrelevant here.) 
It will be observed, then, that when the Legislature itself 
was performing, in part, the function of prescribing mini-
mum qualifications for the position of Division Superintend-
ent, it has always fixed various standards in the alternative, 
and has always made experience in office an independent 
basis of eligibility-the very practice ·which the plaintiffs be-
low contended that the Legislature intended to prohibit, by 
some implication, when it delegated this function :wholly to 
the State Board of Education. 
We next wish to point out that, e1.1er .~ince the adoption of the 
present systen~ 'ttnder the constitutional amend1nent of 1928, 
the State Boa.rd of Ed1tcation has constru.ed the present stat-
ute to permit the establishment, in the alternative, of separate 
and disf,inct sta'lidards of q1~ali{ications, and has consistently 
established MWh alternative stettndards., always 1nakin,(J experi-
ence 1 in office an indepe.ndent baBis of eligibility. · 
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HISTORY OF THE BOARD'S ACTION UNDER THE 
PRESENT STATUTE. 
In Decernber of 1928, fQllowing the adoption of the pres-
ent system and just preceding the time for publishing the 
staten1ent of minimum qualifications to g·overn the 1929 elec-
tions, the Superintendent of Public Instruction notified all 
incumbents that the recently adopted standards of academic 
training and experience would not be applied to incumbents 
whose records were satisfactory, and that the names of these 
incumbents would be placed on the list, which was done (R., 
pp. 20-21, 40). 
On ,January 15, 1929, being shortly before the 1929 elec-
tions, the Board adopted the following resolution: 
''All division superintendents now in office are hereby de-
clared eligible· for reappointment by county and city school 
boards, due to the fact that the State Board of Education 
does not consider that the new requirements for eligibility are 
retroactive. 
''The names of all new applicants for the eligible list were 
considered by the State Board and the list as set up by the 
Superintendent approved. The Superintendent was author-
ized to place on this list all those individuals who apply prior 
to Februa.ry 1, 1929, who meet the requirement.'' (R., pp. 
21, 40.) . 
Accordingly, the Board compiled a list of eligibles which 
it divided into two groups under the respective headings: 
(1) "Incumbents Elig·ible for Reappointment'' and (2) 
''Eligible Applicants for Superintendencies'' (R., pp. 21, 40), 
from which list the appointees for 1929 were selected. 
Thereafter, at its next session, the Legislature reenacted 
Code §649 without change (except in respect to matters not 
material here), thus tacitly approving the Board's construc-
tion. Acts 1H30, chapter 412, p. 883, §649. 
In December, 1931, the Board passed a resolution amend-
ing· the then academic standards of qualifications so as to in-
clude the further alternative requirements of the master's 
degree or its equivalent (in October, 1932, a further amend-
ment omitted the words ''or its equivalent") (R.; pp. 22-23, 
41, 42). · These standards were never applied or intended to 
be applied to incumbents (Id.). In Mat·~h, 1932, notice of the 
new requiren1ents was sent to persons on the eligibility list, 
but not then in office, advising them to meet these standards 
by September 1, 1935; incumbents were not even notified, and 
for the 1933 elections, the list of eligible applicants again 
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included the names of all incumbents who had met the re-
quirements in force at the time of their appointment and had 
since been serving continuously with satisfactory records, 
~egardless of whether these inc~mbents met the academic 
standards required of new and inexperienced applicants. 
Since that time the Board has had frequent occasion to make 
clear ,the construction which it placed on the statute and on 
its own regulations. · 
In . May, . 1935, the following minute was entered in the 
Board's minute book: 
''A ruling of the Board was requested regarding the status 
of former superintendents who do not meet the recent re-
quirenlents for the eligible list. It was the sense of the Board 
that individuals who are not now serving as superintendents 
will be expected to m.eet the new requirements before being 
placed on the eligible list'' (R., pp. 23, 42). 
On December 14, 1935, the following minute was entered: 
''At a previous meeting the Secretary was requested to 
compile a revised list of eligibles for the position of division 
superintendent. In December, 1H31, "the Board raised the 
eligi~ility requirements for the position of division superin-
tendent, and all persons at that time on such list were given 
until• Sept. 1, 1935, in 'vhich to comply with the revised re-
quirements. The following list submitted contains all those 
who have q~uilified under the ne'lo requi,re·1nents, includin_q in-
cumbents, who, by reason of their tenure, a.re placed on the 
list". (R., pp. 23, 42-3). 
The minutes for this same meeting of December 14, 1935, 
contain also the following: 
"In order to emphasize the eligibility of superintendents 
now in office, the follo,ving minute was entered: 
''Division superintendents now in service shall be consid-
ered to have met the eligibility requirements which were in 
force at the time of the beginning of their continuous service, 
and. shall not be removed from the list of eligibles because 
of subsequent changes in eligibility requirements which may 
have been made during the period of their continuous serv-
ice'' (R., p. 24). 
· Thus it appears that the construction of Code §649 which 
we now contend for had been openly and continuously followed 
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by the Board for approximately seven years when the Legisla-
ture, in 1936, again reenacted the statute in its original form 
(adding matter not relevant here). 
Again, on February 18, 193'7, the Board further clarified 
its position by adopting the following resolution: 
"Whereas, some question has been raised as to the eligi-
bility of certain division superintendents now in office; and 
''Whereas, in fixing eligibility qualifications the ineumbency 
of superintendents has uniformly and always been accepted 
as qualifying such superintendents; and, 
''Whereas, this Board did on Decen1ber 14, 1935, adopt a 
resolution and. made a statement sho·wing the minimum quali- , 
fications for the position of division superintendent of schools., 
a part of which minut€s and resolution applicable to the ques-
tion now under consideration is, as follows:'' 
(The minutes here repeat the resolution of December 14, 
1935, as quoted s~tp.ra.) 
"Resolved, that it was the intent and purpose of this Board 
by its said resolution to make division superintendents then 
in service on December 14, 1935, eligible, and such incum-
bency a separate and independent eligibility qualification and a 
fulfillment of all qualifications required of such division su-
perintendents in order to be placed on the list of eligibles; 
and, 
"Resolved further, that in the opinion of this Board, es~ 
pecially in the lig·ht of twenty years or more of uniform 
eligibility qualifications as to superintendents in office, the 
said resolution of December 14, 1935, ·was intended to and 
did express the intenf and purpose as hereinabove set forth'' 
(R., pp. 24-5). 
Afterwards, as has already been stated, the Board certified 
the eligibility list for 193'7, including the names of J. J. Fray,-
W. D. Cox, and at least 54 other Division Superintendents 
'vho did not hold the master's degree, but who had had the 
experience of continuous service as Division SuperintendentR 
since some time before the master's degree requirement was 
adopted. 
From what has just been said, it seems manifest that the 
State Board has always construed the statute just as we now 
contend it should be construed. Certainly the intention of 
the Board is conclusive as to the meaning of its own regula-
-tions, and it is clear that the Board has always intended to 
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treat experience in office with a satisfactory record of service 
as an independent basis of qualification. 
It is apparent that this construction of the statute, adopted 
and followed by the Board, is the only practical construction 
now possible. If the conclusions of the Circuit Court are 
correct, the school system 1nust be demoralized by dis1nissing 
56 experienced Division Superintendents, whose actual rec-
ords have satisfied the Board as to their qualifications, re-
sulting in a sacrifice of the value of their years of experience 
in office. 
This Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of 
such considerations in construing statutes, and the weight to 
be given a practical construction, adopted and followed by 
an administrative body charged with executing the new law 
and tacitly acquiesced in by the Legislature. The propriety 
of considering "practical" or administrative constructions of 
statutes was distinctly recognized by the Supreme Court of 
Appeals as early as 1883 in the case of Lewis v. Whittle, 77 
Va. 415, 422. The earliest and the most familiar full state-
ment of the principle is found in Judge Whittle's opinion in 
81nith. v. Bryan, 100 Va. 199, 40 S. E. 652. In construing cer-
tain city charter provisions, the court said: 
''This'' (the court's) ''interpretation is streng-thened, also, 
by the conceded fact that it had been the universally accepted 
construcl:ion by the cmumunity, and had been acted on by 
every 1\{ftyor who presided over the city from the year 1892, 
at which time the provision in question was first incorporated 
in the amended charter (Acts 1R91-2, p. 314). Subsequently; 
it was, without change, and presumably in the light of that 
construction, carried into the Act of February 2R, 1896, which 
provided a new charter for the city of Roanoke (Acts 1895-6, 
p. 561, Sec. 60). It is a rule of construction that, if a statute 
is of doubtful import, a court will consider the construction 
put upon the act when it first came into operation, and that 
construction, after lapse of time, without change either by the 
Legislature or judicial decision, will be regarded as the cor-
rect construction'' (Citations follow). 
''So, also, the practical construction given to a statute by 
public officials, and acted upon by the people, is not only to be 
considered, but in cases of doubt, will be regarded as de-
cisive. It is allowed the same effect as a course of judicial 
decision. The Legislature is presumed to be cognizant of 
such construction, and, when long continued, in the absence· 
of legislation evincing a dissent, the courts will adopt that 
construction.'' (100 V a., at pp. 203-4.) 
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This rule of construction has been accepted without ques· 
tion and given decisive effect in a long line of decisions ex-
tending to the late case of llunton v. Co·m'inonwealth, 166 Va. 
229, 183 S. E. 873·. Without discussing all of these cases sim-
ply for their repetition of the general rule, attention is called 
to certain of them as reflecting the chief reasons for this prin-
ciple of construction, and to· illustrate the application of those 
reasons to the case at bar. 
In the first place, the mere fact that public officers charged 
with the administration of a law have once given it a cer-
tain construction is a very weighty consideration in favor of 
such construction. As the court said in City of Richmond v. 
Drew.ry-Hughes Co., 122 Va. 178, 193, 94 S. E. 989, 992: 
" * • * It is true that the rule of interpretation which per-
mits the courts to look to the practical construction adopted 
by executive officers is usually applied to cases in which such 
construction has continued and been acquiesced in for a long 
period of time; but it is not to be confined to such cases. One 
reason for the rule is that the officers charged 'With the duty 
of carrying n,ew l01ws into effect are presumed to have famil-
iarized themselves with all the consideration pertinent to the 
m.eanin,q and purpose of the neu.' law, and to have formed an 
independe·nt, conscientious and competent expert opinion 
thereon. The segregation plan was adopted in pursuance of 
a special provision in our State Constitution, and the follow-
ing quotation from Judge Cooley is in point: 
'' 'Great deference has been paid in all cases to the action 
of the executive department, where its officers have been 
called upon, under the responsibilities of their official oaths, 
to inaugurate a new system, and where it is to be presumed 
they have carefully and conscientiously weighed all considera-
tions, and endeavored to keep within the letter and spirit of 
the Constitution. If the question involved is really one of 
doubt, the force of their judgment, especially in view of the 
injurious consequences that may result from disregarding it, 
is fairly entitled to turn the scale in the judicial mind.' 
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed.), page 104." 
(Italics supplied.) 
In the instant case, the State Board of Education is pe-
culiarly aware of the practical implications of permitting ex-
perienced, incumbent superintendents to remain on the eligi-
bility lists regardless of whether they meet the standards re-
quired of new and untried candidates, and the Board's con-
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struction of any doubtful statute on the subject must cer-
tainly be entitled to great weight. 
Again, the unfortunate if not disastrous consequences of 
upsetting a settled administrative construction is an impor-
tant and proper consideration in favor of upholding such con-
struction. Particularly germane is the case of Virginia Iron, 
etc., Co. v. Keystone Iron, etc., Co., 101 Va. 723, 45 S. E. 291. 
Thaf case involved the construction of a dubious statute as 
to the recordation of land patents, and it was contended by 
one of the parties that the practice of recording such patents 
without the lesser seal of the Commonwealth was contrary 
to law. In denying this contention, the court said: 
'' ''Contemporaneous construction and official usage for a 
~ong period, acquiesced in by persons charged with the ad-
ministration of the law, have always been regarded as legiti-
mate aids in the construction of statutes.' 
" 
''The argument ab imconvenienti against a different inter-
pretation ought, under the circumstances, to be controlling. 
"Indeed, for this court no'\v to hold the recordation of all 
patents· for the period named invali~, and that office copies 
are not admissible as evidence, would unsettle land titles 
throughout all the Commonwealth, and result in incalculable 
mischief.***." (Opinion of Judge Whittle, 101 Va., at p. 
728.) 
In the case at bar it appears that there are in the State 
at least fifty-six experienced Division Superintendents of 
Schools whose names are now on the eligibility list for re-
appointment this year-men who have presumably relied on 
the State Board's unvarying assurance that all incumbents 
with satisfactory records would be elig·ible for reappointment 
regardless of the educational requirements imposed on new 
candidates, who would be ousted if the contentions of the 
petitioners below are sound; surely the unjust and demoraliz-
ing consequences of the decision below should be avoided if 
at all possible. 
Fh~.ally, perhaps the most familiar and most obvious rea-
son for the principle set forth in Smith v. Bryan, supra, is 
the apparent legislative sanction in such cases; if a statute 
is being uniformly construed and applied in a manner con-
trary to the original legislative intent, the Legislature would 
hardly let a session go by without removing the doubt-mu'ch 
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less would it reenact the doubtfulla'v in appare"nt confirma- . 
tion of the existing practice. 
The force of this reasoning is distinctly acknowledged in 
the quotation from Smith v. Bryan, .~'ltpra, and seems to have 
been taken foi· granted without further elaboration since that 
time. Its application to the facts of the instant case requires 
no discu~sion. 
In view of the cases referred to, the general principle that 
administrative construction of a doubtful statute is entitled 
to great weight may properly be called elementary. Its ap-
plication, and the application of the considerations of policy 
behind it to the case at bar seem obvious. Certainly, Sec-
tion 649 of the Code does not clearly require the State Board 
to demand of satisfactory incumbents the same credentials 
required of new and unproved applicants, and the Board has 
manifestly felt that it was not so required. Accordingly, it 
has repeatedly assured incumbents that they need not ac-
quire the 1naster 's degree, but would remain eligible so long 
as their records should be satisfactory or until the Board 
should change the requirements. If petitioners' contentions 
are sound, aU of this was in flagrant violation of the legis-
lative intent; yet the Legislature has twice reenacted the 
statute in question without making any effort to alter the 
Board's practice. 
It remains only for us to refute certain propositions urged 
by the petitioners below and greatly relied on by the Circuit" 
Court. · 
Significa;nce of the Provision That'' No One Shall be Eli.flible 
for Appoint·ment as Di-vision Superintendent Unless He 
J1eets the lJ!linimum Qualifica.tions Set Up by the State 
Board of Education"'. 
We earnestly submit that this provision in the statute does 
not restrict the Board's authority to prescribe what those 
minimum qualifications should be; that, in view of the his-
tory of the statute, the Legislature clearly did not intend 
by this provision to require a single, fixed standard and to 
prohibit alternative bases of eligibility. 
It is important to observe the circumstances under which 
this clause was first inserted. As has already been shown, 
the first "minimum qualifications" were prescribed chiefly by 
the Legislature itself, leaving only a limited discretion in this 
respect to the Board: 
'' • • ~ The board shall not consider for division superin-
tendent of schools any man who does not hold, or has not 
18 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
held 1 a State teacher's license the equivalent of a first grade 
certificate, or who has not already held the office of division 
superintendent, or who has not been a teacher for such num-
ber of years as the board may designate, and in order that 
an applicant for the position of division superintendent may 
know what qualifications are required of him, the State board 
of education is hereby required to publish on the first day 
of February of the year in which said election is to take 
place, a statement showing the minimum qualifications for. 
the position of division superintendent of schools, which state-
ment shall be furnished to all applicants on request.'' (Acts 
1916, chapter 467, pp. 789-90, § 1437.) 
In revising this section so as to leave the matter of mini-
mum qualifications entirely to the Board, the Legislature 
merely omitted its own (alternative) standards, and substi-
tuted the provision that "No one shall be eligible," etc., "un-
less he meets the minimum qualifications set up by the State 
Board", etc. Otherwise, the material portion of the section 
remained unchanged. See Acts 1928, at p. 1201, quoted, S1.tpra. 
Thus it appears that the real p1.trpose of this provision was 
simply to indicate a delegation of the function of prescribing 
1nin.imum qualifications-a function which was for1nerly per-
formed by the Legislature in precisely the manner now fol: 
lowed by the Board and held by the Circuit Court to be pro-
hibited by this very provision. 
Significance of the Provision 'l'ha.t "The 8.ztpe1·intendents at 
P4"esent in Office Shall Continue 'l'herein Until Their 
, E . '' Present Terms .:.~Xp~re . 
By coupling this provision with the one last referred to 
above, the petitioners below urged and the Circuit Court in-
ferred that these Superintendents should not be made 
eligible thereafter on the independent ground of their serv-· 
ice in office. It is argued that this proviso was intended to· 
take care of incumbents who would have been otherwise in-
eligible under the new provision in 1928 that ''No one shall 
be eligible'', etc., ''unless he meets the minimum qualifications 
set up by the State Board of Education". The fallacy of 
this reasoning· may be amply demonstrated. 
This provision as to the retention of superintendents has 
been carried forward through various revisions of the statute 
since 1903-long before there tuas stwh a thing as a "·miwim'ltm 
qu.alificarlion '', statutory or otherwise. In each revision of 
the statute, it will be observed that the Legislature alwa~JS 
specifically 11rovided for the date of the forthcornin,q election 
State. Board of Education v. C. H. Carwile, et als. 19 
of superintendents and fixed the term of office for all super-
intendents as running for a stated period thereafter. There-
fore. in thus defining the terms of office in the future only, out 
of an abundance of caution the Legislature has added the 
proviso that incumbents should finish out their then terms · 
as originally fixed. See Acts 1902-3-4, pp. 802-3 ; Acts 1904, 
p. 152 ; Acts 1908, p. 534. 
Again, the fact that this proviso speaks aH of the time of 
each. reenactment since 1928 seems clearly sufficient to show 
that it was not intended to have the effect attributed to it by 
the Circuit Court. 
We submit, therefore, that the grounds and the conclusions 
of the Circuit Court's decision are demonstrably in error, 
and that there is nothing in the statute which restricts the 
Board's general authority to prescribe such reasonable quali-
fications as it sees fit, including the traditional and eminently 
sensible alternativ·e standards now under attack. 
III. 
The Oircu.it Court erred in holding that the State Board of 
Education. did rzot, in fact, presc.ribe such alternative standards 
of qualifict~t-ions. 
The Circuit Court seems to have held not only that the 
State Board of Education could not, legally, follow the statu-
tory precedent of alternative qualifications, making. experience 
in office an independent basis of eligibility, but also held that 
the Board did not do so, and that therefore the 56 Superintend-
ents in question have not met the standards actually fixed ·by 
the Board. 
. In this connection it seems sufficient to refer to the Board's 
uniform practice as described above, and the resolutions 
quoted, showing that the Board unquestionably intended at 
all times to recognize experience in office as a distinct stand-
ard of qualification and to apply the academic requirements 
only to new applicants whose qualifications for this particu-
lar work were comparatively unknown. Surely the Board's 
intention is the controlling criterion in construing its own 
require~ents. 
CONCLUSION. 
In view of the considerations pointed out above, we sub-
mit that the Circuit Court erred in requiring the State Board 
of Education to declare ineligible 56 experienced Division 
Superintendents who, for the past nine years, have acted on 
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the Board's statements as to its own requirements in order 
to make themselves eligible ; that there is nothing in the law 
to ju~tify upsetting this established administrative construc-
tion . which has been acquiesced in by the Legislature and 
which merely continued a practice inaugurated by the Legis-
lature itself; that hence the judgm~nt complained of should 
be reversed and final judgment entered. ' 
PRAYER. 
Your petitioners, therefore! pray that a writ of error and 
. S1tpersedeas be awarded them, in order that such judgment, 
for the causes of error aforesaid, before you may be caused 
to co;me, that the whole matter in the said judgment contained 
may 'be reheard, and that the said judgment may be reversed 
and annulled. 
STATEMENT AS TO ~fAILING AND BRIEF. 
Counsel for the State Board of Education state and aver 
that'a copy of this petition was, on the 28th day of September, 
1937, mailed to opposing counsel in the trial court. 
It' is further stated by counsel that, should a writ of error 
be awarded, this petition is adopted as the opening brief on 
behalf of the State Board of Education. 
REQUEST FOR ·ORAL HEARING ON PETITION. 
Counsel for the State Board of Education desire to state 
ora¥y the reasons for reviewing the decision complained of. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. LEE TRINKLE, 
JOSEPH H. SAUNDERS, 
ROSE MAcDONALD, 
\"'IRGINIDS R. SHACI{LEFORD, 
ROBERT W. DANIEL, 
GORDON BOHANNON, 
DAVE E. SATTERFIELD, 
SIDNEY B. HALL, 
By ABRA~I P. STAPLES, 
Attorney General of Virginia. 
JOS. L. l{ELLY, JR., 
Special Assistant. 
Counsel for the State Board of Education. 
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I, J os. L. Kelly, Jr., an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that in my 
opinion the decision complained of should be reviewed by 
this Court. 
JOS. L. KELLY, ~· 
Received September 28, 1937. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
Writ of error granted; supersedeas awarded. 
Oct. 15/37. 
EDW. W. HUDGINS. 
Received Oct. 15, 1937. 
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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
WM. DEARING COX 
versus 
N. N. HOLT, ET AL. 
PETITION OF WM. DEARING COX. 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and .Associate Justices of the 
Supreme Cou'rt of .Appeals of Y·ir,qinia.: 
Your petitioner, Wm. Dearing Cox, respectfully represents 
that he is aggrieved by an order entered against him and 
the State Board of Education by the Circuit Court of the 
City of Richmond on the 31st day of July, 1937, on a peti-
tion filed by N. N. Holt and others against the State Board 
of Education in the said Circuit Court of the City of Rich-
mond, in which proceedings this petitioner was allowed to in-
tervene and become a party defendant, praying for a per-
emptory writ of mandamus against the members of the afore-
said State Board of Education of Virginia, commanding and 
compelling them to eliminate the name of your petitioner from 
the list of persons certified to the School Board of the County 
of Amherst as having met the minimum qualifications set up 
by the State Board of Education for appointment to the posi-
tion of division superintendent of schools in the State of Vir-
ginia, which order entered on the 31st day of July, 1937, did 
adjudge and order that a peremptory writ of mandamus be 
award~d against the State Board of Education of the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, commanding and directing the afore-
said State Board to prepare and forward to the School Board 
of the County of Amherst a list of applicants for division 
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superintend~nt of schools who have met the minimum quali-
fications established by the aforesaid State Board for the 
position of _the division superintendent of schools, and that 
the ·name of the said W m. Dearing Cox be not included in 
said li~t: ~shaving met the said minimum qualifications set up 
by the aforesaid State Board. 
A transcript of the record is herewith presented with this 
petition. The action of the court in overruling the demurrer 
of your petitioner and in entering the said orders of Febru-
ary 27, and July 31, 1937, are assigned as errors. 
This ·cause came on to be heard on the petition for the writ 
of mandamus, the demurrer of your petitioner, and the sepa-
rate answers of. the State Board of Education of Virginia 
and of your petitioner. 
The sole question involved here is that the name of your 
petitioner should be stricken by the State Board of Education 
from! the list published by the. State Board of Education of 
those who are eligible for appointment as division super-
intendent of schools because your petitioner does not hold a 
Master of Arts· degree . 
. The petition contains no other prayer. 
I. 
THE DEMURRER OF YOUR PETITIONER SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED. 
In ·discussing the demurrer the merits of the case as set 
forth.in the petition and answer will necessarily be largely in-· 
volved and, therefore, the allegations of the demurrer and 
answer will, to a large extent, be argued together. 
By' Section 609 of the Code, in pursuance of Section 132, 
third, of the Constitution, the State ·Board of Education was 
allowed to mak.e all needful rules and regulations not incon-
sistent with law for the management a~d conduct of the 
schools, and it was therein declared th'at such rules and regu-
lations, when published and distributed, shall have the force 
and effect of law until revised, amended, or repealed by the 
General Assembly. 
The resolution adopted by the State Board of Education 
on January 15, 1929, that all division superintendents then 
in office were declared eligible for reappointment by the re-
. spective school boards, has never been rescinded nor has the 
General Assembly enacted a statute making the resolution of 
January 15, 1929, inconsistent with law. 
On 1 the contrary resolutions were adopted on May 23, 1935, 
December 14, 1935, and June 25, 1936 (see answer of the 
--.. 
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State Board of Education), each said resolution specifically 
setting forth that the new requirement of an ~{. A. degree 
for eligibility as a division school superinte.ndent did not apply 
'to inctimbent divisi.on superintendents. ~- . 
In keeping with the aforesaid resolutions nq notice .of the 
a1nendment in the requirement of qualifications for eligibility 
for division superintendents increasing the requirements to 
an :rvr. A. degree was sent to the division superintendents then 
holding that office since it did not apply to them. Nowhere 
does the petition show that the former resolutions of the 
State Board, culminating in the said regulation adopted on 
June 25, 1936, declaring that superintendents then in office 
were considered as having met the elig·ibility requirements~ are 
inconsistent with the statutes. The Petition merely alleges, 
without proof, that it is inconsistent. 
It is here further contended. that a petition for mandamus 
could not be filed and brought against the State Board o{ 
Ed\1catiori on F'ebruary 27, 1937, to 1nake that Boa.rd undo 
'vhat the statute had prescribed-was mandatory, and·had to 
be done by the State Board on the first of February, 1937, 
and which list of eligibles was published by the said State_ 
Board on the first of February, 1937. The matter and power 
to name eligibles under the law was wholly out of the hands 
of the State Board,~ after Ic.,ebruary 1, 1937_, and under that 
section, as well as under the Constitution, the entire power 
of appoinbuent had passed to the School. Board of Amherst 
County which alone had authority to na1ne its school super~ 
intendent. The Amherst Countv School Board could have 
on the secm1d day of March, 193.7_, named your petitioner as 
division school superintendent for Amherst County as that 
would have been within sixty (60) days before 1\fay 1, 193·7. 
Any action as to the appointment of your petitioner as di-
vision superintendent taken after February 1, 1937, ·must 
necessarily have been against the School Board of Amherst 
County, Section 649; enacting that the school boards of each 
school division shall appoint a .division ·superintendent of 
schools selected from the list of eligibles, which had been cer-
tified to the Amherst County Scnool Board on February l 
preceding by the State Board of Education, on which list was 
the name of· your petitioner.· 
The order entered by the trial court of the City of Richmond 
on February 27, 1937, was not propedy entered because the 
School Board of Amherst County was not a party to the pe-
tition and was not before the court, and the. State Board of 
Education had no authority whatever over the duties that 
the Constitution and the statutes prescribe that the Amherst 
County Scbool Board shall perform. 
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CLAUSES 11 AND 12 OF THE DEMURRER. 
Especially do we urge that paragraphs 11 and 12 of the 
demurrer should have been sustained. 
The entire action in adopting rules and. regulations for the 
conduct and management of the schools required the exercise. 
of juaicial functions calling for discretion and judgment on 
the part of the said State Board, and the Board could not act, 
and was not acting, and did not act, in adopting such regula-
tions in a purely ministerial capacity. 
It was urg·ed before the trial court that because Section 
649 of the Code prescribed that ''The superintendents at pres-
ent in office shall continue therein until their present terms 
expire'', that that sentence meant and should be construed 
as meaning· that the superintendents would not be qualified 
to continue in office merely because they were then incum-
bents. 
We submit that that enactment 'vas incorporated in Section 
649_merely and solely because the General Assembly had no 
way of knowing in 1928 when Section 649 was first enacted, 
what qualifications for division superintendents the State 
Board would require. The Legislature did not then know 
whether or not the State Board would say that satisfactory 
tenure as division superintendent would be a sufficient quali-
fication. 
In the event that the State Board did not so determine then 
the Legislature, out of caution, and in ·order not to disrupt 
the public school syste1n of the State, declared that, although 
the State Board should determine that present incumbency 
as a division superintendent alone did not. qualify the in-
cumbent for reelection, but that he must have other quali-
fications, yet the superintendents then in office should continue 
therein until their terms expired. As it eventuated that clause 
of Section 649 proved unnecessary under the rules and regu-
lations adopted by the State Board. For the State Board of 
Education to determine whether the division superintendent 
should haye a Master's degree, or whether the Board consid-
ered it sufficient for his eligibility that he was already au 
incumbent, required judicial discretion and judgment in reach-
ing a final conclusion as to what qualifications should be con-
sidered neceRsary for eligibles. 
The Board alone could determine the "rules ..and regula-
tions not inconsistent with law for the management and con-
duct of the schools". Surely, to read that requirement is to 
be convinced that it calls for judicial judgment and discre-
tion. ' 
The State Board is not, and it cannot be logically argued 
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that it is, acting in a ministerial capacity when the members 
thereof sit, discuss, and finally decide and determine what 
qualifications or experience, in their judgment and· discre-
tion, a division superintendent should possess. The court will 
almost take judicial notice that when the eight membe·rs of 
the State Board, male and female, come together to. deter-
mine the requirements demanded of division superintendents 
that there will almost necessarily be divergent views, much 
discussion, and finally the eight members, or a majority of 
them in the exercise of their discretion and judgment, will 
finally vote in favour of certain qualifications and require-
ments demanded of division superintendents. Then the State 
Board of Education will publish and distribute their resolu-
tion showing the minimum qualifications for position of di-
vision superintendent of schools. 
Shall outsiders, strangers, taxpayers, school patrons, or 
however they may be denominated, come and dictate to the 
State Board of Education what they may, or how they may, 
think, and whom they may designate as eligibles for division 
superintendents under the authority granted the Board un.; 
der both the Constitution and Laws of Virginia 1 
In this conjunction we cite the following authorities: 
Thurston v. Hudgins, 93 Va. 780, 781: 
Thurston filed his petition for a mandamus against Thos. 
J. Hudgins, oyster inspector, to compel him to take action to 
remove stakes from certain oyster grounds alleged to be il-
legally assigned by said oyster inspector, who had assigned 
the oyster grounds to certain private parties. Petitioners al-
leg·ed the grounds were natural oyster beds and as such under 
the statute could not be assigned by the inspector. Sec-
tions 2153, 2137, of the Code of 1887 by which the case was 
controlled. 
Th~ court said, page 783 : 
',.The de<;ision of this case turns upon the question whether 
the duties imposed upon an oyster inspector • • • are purely 
ministerial in their nature, or are duties necessarily calling 
for the exercise of discretion and judgment in their perform-
ance. If they belong to the latter class, the petitioner was 
not entitled to a mandamus, • * • and the demurrer ought 
to have been sustained; for it is well settled that mandamus 
will not lie to compel the performance of any act or duty 
necessarily calling for the exercise of judgment and discretion 
on the part of the official charged with its performance.'' 
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The court then cites various authorities, including the Su-
preme Court of the United States·. 
The court then stated that under Section 2137 of the Code 
when one applied for a location of oyster grounds the in-
spe'ctor had to ascertain whether under the law such ground 
could be set apart for the exclusive use of the applicant. 
Th~t fo ·do so the inspector had to determine whether the 
desired location contained any· natural oyster bed, or con-
flicted with riparian owners' claims, or for any reason was 
:not subject to location. 
: The court said, page 784 : 
''This would require the examination of the premises, the 
investigation of facts, and the forming of his judgment 
thereon. It is clear, therefore, that the duties of such in-
spector are not purely ministerial, but quasi judicial in their 
nature, requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion in 
their performance. 
· ''Not only were these duties quasi judicial, but the inspector 
~ad :exercised his judgment, and ascertained that said twenty 
acres of oyster grounds were subject to such entry, and had 
assigned them. The petition admits this. The object of the 
petitioner, therefore, was not only to compel the inspector 
to undo what 'had been done' (he had done) but compel hhn 
to do a specific act without reference to the opinion of the 
inspector upon the subject.'' 
"It is also well settled that mandamus does not lie to com-
. pel.an officer to undo what he has done in the exercise of 
his judgment and discretion, and to do what he had already 
determined ought not to be done, as is sought in this case.'' 
Th'lfrston v. Hudgins, supra, 93 Va. 780. · 
The case of Rowe and Others v. Drisgell, 100 Va. 137, is 
also cited: 
Rowe and others filed a petition for a writ of mandamus 
in the Supreme Court of Virginia, stating they had applied 
to the Oyster Inspector and obtained a tongman's license un-
der the law to take oysters from all natural oyster· beds of 
Virginia; that the State Board was required by law, Act 
March 2, 1894, to have made an accurate survey of the natural 
oyster beds of the Commonwealth; that when said survey 
was made it did not include the oyster beds of l{ing and 
Queen County; that on March 3, 1898, an act was passed di-
recting such survey to be made for that county; that such sur-
vey was made and under the law it had the same force, and 
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stood on the same footing, as the Baylor survey under the 
act of ]\{arch 2, 1894. 
After the completion of the Baylor survey, and before the 
act relating to King & Queen County survey, Richardson 
leased fron1 Drisgell, Oyster Inspector, certain grounds the 
Oyster Inspector claimed were oyster planting grounds, and 
which he under the law was authorized to lease, but which the 
petitioners alleged were natural oyster beds not subject to 
be ieased. 
Petitioners claimed that under the survey of act of 1898 
for King & Queen County the assignment to Richardson was 
contrary to law because the g-round leased 'vas a natural 
oyster bed. 1\fuch evidence seems to have been taken on both 
sides. The court said, page 140: 
''It may be said that the evidence preponderates in favour 
of the_ view that the area assig·ned to Richardson was at one. 
time considered a natural oyster bed, but 'it seemed likely' 
it _had been exhausted, or * «c «< depleted of its oysters.'' 
The court continued: 
''These questions required the consideration of evidence in 
.order to determine the rights of the parties, and makes the 
duty imposed upon the inspector quasi judicial in its na-
ture." Page 140. 
Judge Keith further continued, page 141: 
''The duties required of the inspector in this case under t11e 
circumstances which we have narrated are certainly not less 
judicial in their nature than those disclosed in Thurston v. 
Hurl,qin:;;, 93 Va. 780, where this court construing in large· 
nteasure the section of the Code relied upon here, and es-
}Jecia11y Sections 2135 and 2137, says: 'The decision turns 
upon the question whether the duties imposed upon an oyster 
inspector by the provisions of the Code above quoted are 
}lurely n1inisterial in their nature or are duties necessarily 
ca1ling for the exercise of judgment and discretion in their 
performance. If they belong to the latter class, the peti-
tioner was not entitled to a mandamus upon the facts stated 
in his petition, and the demurrer ought to have been sus-
tained; for it is well settled that mandamus will not lie to con1-
pel the perforn1ance of any act or duty necessarily calling for 
the ~xercise of judgment and discretion on the part of the 
official charged with its performance.' '' 
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"In the case before us the principle here announced ap-
plies 'with all its force.'' 
"A further examination of the opinion in Thurston v. 
II ud.gins makes this conclusion all the more certain.'' 
The court continued to quote fron1, reiterate the principle 
set forth in the last named case, and to reaffirn1, and confirm 
it. The court, in concluding its opinion, thus stated: 
"Whatever the opinion of the inspector may have been as 
disclosed by his testimony, the fact remains that he refused 
to the petitioners the relief which they sought, and, they 
seeking from this court the extraordinary right of mandamus, 
we are under the necessity of inquiring into, not the opinion of 
the Oyster Inspector with t·espect to the d~tty required of hitn, 
b·ut the essent'tal nat'U,re of that duty, and if 'We ascertain that 
a m{!!ndamus is sought to co~mpel him to 11e1·form a judicial 
/'Unction we are const1·ained to deny the u"'rit.'' 
Judge Buchanan, who delivered the opinion in Thurston 
v. Hudgins, differentiated and disting·uished the case of Le·wis 
v. Christian, 101 V a. 135, from the. first named case. He 
held that in the latter case the duty of the oyster inspector 
was' wholly ministerial, natnely, to remove stakes from around· 
natural oyster rocks as shown by a survey already made.· 
That the inspector had no discretion in the matter if the 
stakes were within the lines of the survey, including the na-
tural oyster beds. The case of Dawson v. Thu,rston, 2 H. 
& ~I. 132, among others was cited, where the court refused 
to admit a properly executed deed to record. It was a merely 
ministerial duty, and 1nandam~s would lie. 
See also U. S .. Fidelity & Guara;nty Go. v. Peebles, 100 Va. 
585; where the court held that the inferior court was required 
to perform a wholly ministerial function, and no judgment 
or discretion was to be exercised, and mandamus would lie. 
The case of Ha·rt·ison v. Barksdale, 127 Va. 180, 190, 192, 
also discusses at length the nature of a function purely Inin-
isterial and distinguishes it from a case wherein a judicial 
or quasi judicial judgment is involved,. and holding that in 
that case mandamus was the proper remedy if the alleg·atio11s 
of ~the petition were sustained by the facts proven. ]\fan-
damns, however, was refused because the court held the 
n1erits did not justify its issuance, in that case. 
Though not directly involving the questions at issue in the 
in~tant case interesting discussions concerning mandamus 
proceedings are also found in the following cases: 
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City of Roanoke v. Elliott, 132 Va. 393, 410, 411. 
Field v. Steed1nan, 142 Va. 383, 390. 
- F'ltgate v. West on, 156 Va. 107. 
In the last mentioned case J ustiee Prentis delivered a 
dissenting opinion of 38 pages wherein he stated, page 157, 
that it "was 'vritten in the vain hope that it would convince 
the majority" . 
.As to the General Law: 
''It is a well recognized rule that where the performance 
of an official duty or act involves· the exercise of judgment 
or discretion, the officer cannot ordinarily be controlled with 
respect to the particular action he will take in the matter; 
he can only be directed to act, leaving the matter as to what 
particular action he will take to his determination. There-
fore, where an officer, in the exercise of a discretionary power 
has considered and determined what his course of· action is 
to be, he has exercised. his discretion, and his action is not 
subject to review or control by mandamus. And as a gen-
eral rule where an officer or subordinate body is vested with 
power to determine a question of fact involving the examina-
tion of evidence and passing on its probative force and effect 
the duty is judicial, and though it can be compelled by man-
damus to determine the fact, it cannot be directed to decide 
in a patticular way; however clearly it be made to appear 
what the decis.ion ought to be. Were the rule otherwise, in-
stead of officers discharging their duties in accordance with 
their own discretion, that of a court would be substituted 
therefor.'' 
18 R. 0. L., Section 38, citing· many cases. 
Again: 
''When the operative effect of the action sought to be 
coerced depends upon the cooperative action of a third per-
son who is not before the court, the writ will not be ordinarily 
granted, the court having no power to coerce the cooperation 
of such third party. Thus, the secretary of a legislative body 
-cannot be compelled by mandamus to insert in his records 
matter which that body has refused to consider or receive, 
and the printing of which it has refused to allow.'' 
18 R. C. L., Section 56, and illustrations given and authori-
ties cited. · 
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We call attention to this : 
"It. is very common practice for the legislature to estab-
lish state boards and intrust them with the performance of 
certain duties and functions, and the question has arisen in 
a nurp.ber of cases as to the authority of the courts to control 
their 'action through the judicial process of mandamus. The 
proper rule in this connection is that where such boards act 
in a quasi judicial character they cannot be controlled in 
the exercise of their leg·itimate discretion by mandamus; so 
long .as they act within the law and a reasonable discretion 
they are subject to no control save that of the legislature." 
il.8 R. C. L., Section 118 (191.7). 
II. 
The petitioners, entirely overlooking and disregarding 
what leads up to the determination of.what shall be the quali-
fications required, and the judgment and discretion exercised 
by the State Board in reaching their conclusions, jump over 
~his entire matter and urge that it is a mere ministerial duty 
to strike off the list of eligibles all those who do not hold a 
Master's degree. 
In' order to maintain this position they have to contend 
that. the State Board of Education was 'vholly without au-
thority to adopt alternative qualifications for the office of 
division superintendent. There is no foundation for such a 
position. Section 132, Third, of the Constitution says the 
State Board ''shall have such authority to make rules and 
regulations for the management and conduct of the schools 
as the General Assembly may prescribe". 
Section· 609 says: 
''The State Board of Education tnay adopt by-la,vs for its 
own government, and make all needful rules and regulations 
not inconsistent with law for the management and conduct 
of the schools. Such rules and regulations not inconsistent 
wit)llaw when published and distributed shall have the force 
and effect of law until revised, amended or repealed by the 
General Assembly.'' 
Is there anything in either of the foregoing cited sections 
that withholds from the State Board the power to adopt and 
ordain qualifications in the alternative for division superin-
tendent? We submit there is not. 
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Let us follow the history of the qualifications for division 
superint~ndents and observe what qu_alifications the General 
Assembly adopted when it prescribed the necessary qualifica-
tions prior to the amendment of the Constitution in 1928. 
Acts of Assembly, 1916, page 789: 
'• The board shall not consider for division superintendent 
of schools any man, who does not hold, or has not held, a 
State teacher's license, the equivalent of a first grade cer-
tificate, or who has not already held the office of division 
superintendent, or who has not been a teacher for such num-
ber of years as the board may designate, and in order that 
¥- * . * an applicant * * * . " 
This enactment of 1916 seems to have been the first state-
ment of specific academical qualifications that I find. The Gen-
eral Assembly, in its judgment and wisdom, did not re-
quire of division superintendents one of two qualifications, 
· but gave them the option of one of three qualifications. This 
act continued until, and was the last enactment of the Legis-
lature before, there was passed oyer to the State Board of 
Edncation the matter as to the absolute control of the regula-
tions and rules of the public school system of the Common-
wealth of Virg·inia as ordered by the amended Constitution. 
\Vhat did the State Board of Education then do when this 
additional authority and power was given it? It naturally 
followed to a larg·e extent the system that the General As-
sembly had pursued. It adopted forthwith that incumbent 
division superintendents of schools were eligible for reap-
pointment regardless of their academic qualifications as all 
of the preceding enactments of the General Assembly had 
prescribed. 
To repeat briefly: 
The enactment of the acts of 1916, page 789, never amended 
in relation thereto, adopted as an alternative requirement for 
eligibility the fact that a school superintendent who was an 
incumbent was a sufficient qualification for his reelection as 
division superintendent. This alternative qualification was 
merely taken ove.r by the State Board of Education from the 
General Assembly and continued with the board so long as 
that board appointed the division superintendent and has 
been likewise continued up to the present time. Although 
Section 649 of the Code has been amended three times, namely, 
in 1928, 1930, and as late as 1936, and although division su-
perintendents have been elected three times, 1929, 1933, 1937, 
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since the amendment to the Constitution, the General As-
sembly has never seen fit to change the regulation and rule 
that incumbency in office was a sufficient qualification for 
the reelection of a division superintendent. 
When under the final acts of 1930, the State Board of Edu-
cation was given full authority to promulgate rules and regu-
lations as to the conduct and control of the schools, the regu-
lation that an applicant was an incumbent or already serving 
as a ,school superintendent was passed on to the State Board 
of Education from the 1916 Acts of Assembly, and very 
naturally adopted by it as being in keeping with the expres-
sion of the General Assmnbly as a sufficient qualification for 
a division superintendent, being in keeping with the policy 
of the State as set forth in the said Act of 1916, and con-
tinued by the Legislature as a sufficient alternative qualifi- · 
cation until the determining· of the qualifications of division 
-superintendents was left wholly to the State Board of Edu-
cation. 
As pointed out the Legislature has never enacted any law 
to change the State Board of Education's interpretation of 
the law as enacted under the acts of Assembly of 1916, and 
under Section G49 of the Code, which Section 649 has been 
consistently continued by the Legislature as to the interpre-
tati<Jn given that section by the State Board of Education in 
promnlgatinv; and publishing the qualifications for division 
superintendents. 
It would seem, without burdening the court by undue repe-
tition, that under the interpretation given the State Board 
of Education's right to act, as shown by the State Board's 
actions, as well as the unamended Acts of the General As-
sembly, the authority was delegated to the State Board of 
Education so to interpret the statute, as it was the policy 
of the General Assembly still to allow the State Board to 
name as eligibles incumbent division superintendents regard-
less of their academic qualifications just as the General As-
sembly under the act of 1916 for years specifically authorized 
the appointment of incumbent superintendents without regard 
to what their academic qualifications were. ~ 
This should seem to be conclusive of the matter. How-
ever, if there be doubt, under the decisions of this court such 
doubts should be resolved in favour of the. State Board of 
Education and of the interpretation that Board has so pub-
licly given the statute in the appointment of practically a 
majority of the division superintendents throughout the 
State. 
The case of Sn~ith v. B~·yan, 100 Va. 199, is cited to show 
the. effect and worth given to. the interpretation of a statute by 
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public officials or board or commission charged with inter-
preting a given statute in the administration and execution of 
public duties placed upon them or it. 
In that case J'udge Whittle said: 
''It is a rule of construction that, if a statute is of doubtful 
import, a court will consider the construction put upon the 
act when it first came into operation, and that construction, 
after lapse of ti1ne, without change either by the Legislature 
o.r judicial decision, will be regarded as the correct construc-
tion. 
• 
''So, also, the practical construction given to a statute by 
public officials, and acted upon by the people, is not only to 
be considered, ·but, in cases of doubt, will be regarded as 
decisive. It is allowed the same effect as a course of judicial 
decision. ·The Legislature is presumed to be cognizal}t of 
such construction, and, when long continued, in the absence 
of legislation, e-vincing a dissent, the co·urts will adopt that 
construction." (Italics ours.) · 
We likewise cite City of Richmond v. Dre~ory-H ughes Oom-
1Jany, 122 Va. 178, 193, 194: 
''The rule of interpretation which permits the courts to 
look to the practical construction adopted by executive of-
ficers is usually applied to· cases in which such construction 
has continued and been acquiesced in for a long period of time; 
but it is not confined to such cases. One reason for the rule 
is that the officers charged with the duty of carrying new 
laws into effect are presumed to have familiarized them-
selves with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning 
and purpose of the new law, and to have formed an inde-
pendent, conscientious, and competent expert opinion there-
on.'' 
Judge Kelly continued, and quoted from Judge Cooley: 
"Great deference has been paid in all cases to the action 
of the executive department, where its of.ficers have been called 
upon, under the responsibilities of their official oaths, to in-
augurate a new system, and where it is to be presumed they 
have carefully and conscientiously weighed all considerations 
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and endeavoured to keep within the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution. If the question involved is merely one of doubt, 
the force of their j'ltdgment, especially in view of the injurious 
consequence-s that ma;y result fro'ln dis'regarding it, is fairly 
entitled to tU'rn the scale in the j?.tdicial 'lttind. '' · 
Qther cases might be .quoted from, but it would be mere 
repetition. 
. W ~ are advised that the Attorney-General, on behalf of the 
State Board of Education, will fully present this matter and 
every issue to the court, and we here merely site as additional 
authorities: State Highway Co·mrnission v. TYilliams, 217, 
227; City of Norfolk v. Bell, 149 Va. 772; Virginia bAon, Etc., 
Company v. Keystone Iron, Etc., Gornpany, 101 Va. 723, the 
latter case a very pertinent case in relation to the issues i~­
volved in this case, showing that the court adopted the view 
and interpretation of Judge Cooley, and as to where inju1·i-
ou.~ consequences might result the court said: 
''Indeed, for this court now to hold the recordation of all 
patents for the period named invalid, and that office copies 
are· not admissible as evidence, would unsettle land· titles -
throughout all the Commonwealth, and result in incalculable 
mischief.'' 
I 
See ~lso Ballard v. Common.~wealth, 156 Va. 980 (Syllabus 
14), page 998. 
This principle of interpretation has been so universally 
adopted that it has become elementary, and it seems that it is 
idle and unnecessary to pursue the question further before 
the court. 
CONCLUSION. 
1. We submit that the demurrer should have been sustained: 
a. That the State Board of Education had plenary authority 
to adopt such rules and regulations not inconsistent with law 
for the management and conduct of the schools as it saw fit. 
b. That the State Board of Education was 'vithout power 
or authority on the 27th of February, 1937, to revise or pub-
lish a list of eligibles for the office of division superintendent 
as the said list was published on February 1, 1937, as the stat-
ute provided and directed and all authority or power over said 
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list passed from the State Board of Education on February 
1, 1937. 
That any action as to said list against the State Board of 
Education had to be taken prior to February 1, 1937. 
c. The Circuit Court of the City of Richmond was without 
power or authority to enter any order that controlled the 
action of the School Board of Amherst County as the said 
County School Board was not a party to the petition pray-
ing for the peremptory writ of mandamus, and the statute 
prescribes that said County School Board shall after Feb-
ruary 1, and within 60 days before May 1, appoint a division 
superintendent, and the State Board of Education could in no 
way control the action or powers of the School Board of Am-
herst County after February 1, 1937. 
d. Because a peremptory writ of mandamus does not lie 
to control the actions of the State Board of Education ex-
ercising its discretionary powers and judgment in judicial, 
or semi, or quasi ~udicial capacity. 
2. That the petition should be dismissed under the allega-
tions of the answer because the State Board of Education 
acted wholly within its power and authority in adopting al-
ternative qualifications in establishing the requirements for 
the office of division superintendent. 
Your petitioner asks that this petition may be read and 
treated as ·his opening· brief. 
A copy of this Petition was mailed at Amherst, Virginia, 
on September 8th, 1937, to J. Tinsley Coleman, Lovingston, 
Virginia. 
Therefore, your petitioner prays that for the foregoing and 
other errors appearing in the record a writ of error and super-
.~edeas be awarded to the judgment complained of and the 
orders entered in this cause, and that the proceeding be re-
viewed and reversed. · 
WM. KlNCl{LE ALLEN, 
W~f. DEARING COX, 
By Counsel. 
Attorney for Wm. Dearing Cox. 
I, vVm. Kinckle Allen, an attorney practicing in the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, certify that in my opin-. 
ion it is proper that the decision of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Rich1nond in the case of N. N. Holt, et als., v. State 
38 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Board of Education and Vim. Dearing Cox should be reviewed 
by the Supreme Court of Appeals .. 
WM. KINCKLE ALLEN. 
September 8, 1937. 
Writ of error awarded. Bond $300. 
Oct. 15/37. 
EDW. W. HUDGINS. 
Reb'd October 15, 1937. 
M. B. W. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Record of the Proceeding·s had before the Court afore-
said, in the Court Room jn the City Hall, ou Petitions for 
Mandamus presented by 
N. N. Holt and others, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
State Board· of FJducation, Defendant. 
and 
I 
Coley H. Carwile, et al., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
State Board . of Education, Defendant . 
• 
wherein an ·order was entered Saturday, July 31, 1937, from 
which judgment of the Court therein eontained, .notice of 
appeal has been given . 
. 
B~ .It R~mem~ered, that heretofore, to-wit: On Saturday 
the 27th day of February, 1937, came .N. N. Holt and others 
~nd, Coley H. Carwile, et al., and presented to the Court, by 
their respective attorneys, their petitions for peremptory 
writs of- n1andamus against the Virginia State Board of Edu-: 
cation, which petitions are as follows: 
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page 2 ~ . Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
To the Honorable Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, 
Virginia: 
Your petitioners, N. N. Holt, A. Strode Brockman, W. P. 
Martin, A. J.J. Faulconer and F. T. Faulconer, citizens and 
taxpayers of the County of Amherst, in the State of Virginia, 
respectfully represent : 
That heretofore, to-wit, on December 4th, 1931, the State 
Board of Education, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 
132 and 133 of the Constitution of Virginia and Section 649 
of the Code of Virginia, s~t up certain minimum qualifica-
tions for division superintendents of schools throughout the 
State of Virginia. That pursuant to the provisions of the 
Constitution and Code hereinbefore mentioned, the qualifica-
tions and requirements set up by said State Board of Educa-
tion were forwarded to each applicant for the position of 
division superintendent of schools. 
That· on, to-wit, October 27th, ·1932, the State Board of· 
Education amended said minimum qualifications and require-
ments; which amendment was forwarded to all of the then 
division superintendents of schools and all applicants for the 
position of superintendent of schools. Under the . minimum 
requirements adopted Dec. 4, 1931, and amended October 27, 
1932, all applicants for the position of division superintend-
ent of schools in the state of Virginia, thereafter 
page 3 ~ were given until September 1, 1935, to meet the re-
qui 1·ements and thereby become eligible for the po-
sition of division superintendent of schools. 
That thereafter, to-wit, on June 25, 1936, the State Board 
of Education, contrary to the Constitution and Statute law 
of v a., hereinabove referred to, adopted a resolution pro-
viding, in effect that the minimum qualifications and require-
ments shou]d not be applicable to division superintendents 
then in Rervice, but that said superintendents then in service 
were declared to have met the eligibility requirements and 
were thereby elig·ible for election by the various school boards 
iu the State of Virginia to the position of division superin-
tendent of schools, regardless of their actual qualifications 
and regardless of whether or not they met the requirements 
set up by the State Board of Education under the Constitu-
tion and Statute of Virginia. 
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That prior to February 1, 1937, th~ State Board of Educa-
tion fonvarded to the School Board of Amherst County, Vir-
ginia, the list of those persons purporting to be eligible for 
elHction to the position of division superintendent of schools 
of Amherst County, Virginia; that on said list appears the 
name of \V. D. Cox, of Amherst, Virginia. 
Your petitioners aver and charge that the said W. D. Cox 
has not met and is now unable to meet the. minimum qualifi-
cations and requirements set up by the State Board of Edu-
cation and now in force, which said qualifications and require-
ments were set up and are now in force under the 
page 4 ~ provisions of the Constitution and Statute Law of 
Virginia-. 
Wherefore your petitioners, being withou~ any other ade-
quate remedy, prays that a peremptory wnt of mandamus 
may be issued by this Honorable Court, directed to E. Lee 
Trinkle, of Roanoke, V a. ; Joseph IL Saunders, of Newport 
News,.. Va.; Rose MacDonald, of Berryville, Va.; Virgin~ us 
R. Shackleford, of Orange, Va.; Robert W. Daniel, of Prince 
George, Va.; J. Gordon Bohannon, of Petersburg, Va.; Dave 
E. Satterfield, of Richmond, V a., and Sidney B. Hall, State 
Superintendent, Richmond, Va., constituting the State Board 
·of Education, commanding and compelling them, as the State 
Board of Education of the State of Virginia, to make up and 
forward to the School Board of Amherst, Virginia, a list of 
those ·persons who have met the minimum requirements and 
qualifications that ha:ve been set up by the State Board of Edu-
cation for the election to the position of division superin-
tendent of schools for the division composed of Amherst 
County, Va., and that the name of W. D. Cox be eliminated 
from said list as one not having met the minimum require-
ments and qualifications set up as aforesaid, and that all such 
oth~r, further and general relief be granted your petitioners 
as the nature of their case may require. · 
J. T. COLE.n1:AN, JR., 
p. p. 
N. N. HOLT, 
A. STRODE BROCKMAN, 
W. P. MARTIN, 
A. L. FAULCONER, 
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Co~nty of .Amherst, To-wit: 
·Th~s day N. N. Holt, A. Strode Brockman, vY. P. Martin, 
A. L. Fa"Ql<:oner and. F. T. Faulooner appeared before me, 
MQr~if~ H. lludaon, a. Notary Public in a11d fQr the County of 
Amherst, in the Sta.t~ o£ Virginia, in my County aforesaid, 
and made oath that the matters and things stated in the 
fol~egoing petit~on are tru,Q and c.o:n·ect to the best of their 
knowledge, infoqu~tion and beUef. 
My commtssion ~~piros on the lO day of Sept., 1937. 
Given under my band this 15 day Qf F~bruary, 1937. 
MORRIS II. HUDSON, N. P. 
Virginia: 
In the Qirq-qit Oourt of th~ City of Ricl.n;nond. 
To the Honorable Julien Gunn, Judge of the Circuit 0Qurt 
of the City of Richmond: 
Your petitioners, Coley H. Carwile, C. E. Crews, J. P. _ ./ 
Pillow, W. B. Anderson and J. \Vhitney Evans, citizens and V 
taxpavers of the County of Campbell, in the State Oi V 1rgmia, 
respectfully represent: 
That Section 132 of the Constitution of the State of Vir .. 
ginia, which prescribes the. powers and duties of the State 
Board of Education of the said State of Virginia, is in the_ 
following la11g·uage, to .. wit: · 
page 6} "~132. POWERS AND DUTIES OF ST~TE 
BOARD OF EDUOATION.~The duties and pow-
ers of the State board of education shall be as follows: 
First. It shall divide the State into appropriate school di-
visions, comprising not less than one county or city each, 
but no county or city shall be divided in the formation of 
such divisions. It shall certifv to the local school board or 
-, /.boards of each division in the WState a list of persons having 
V reasonable academic and . · uali • ons for division 
~uper1n en ent of schools, one of whom shall be selected as 
the superintendent of schools for such division by the said .\ 
school board or boards, as provided by section one hundred \ 
and thirty-three of this Constitution. I 
.I 
_I 
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Second. It shalJ have the management and investment of 
the school fui1d under regulations prescribed by law. 
Third. It shall have such authority to make rules and regu-
lations for the manag·en1ent and conduct of the schools as 
the general assembly may prescribe ; but until otherwise pro-
vided by la,v, the State board of education may continue ex-
isting rules and regulations in . force and amend or change 
the same. 
Fourth. It shall select textbooks and educational appli-
ances for use in the schools of the State, exercising such 
discretion as it may see fit in the selection of books suitable 
for the schools in the cities and counties, respectively; pro-
vided, however, the general assembly may prescribe the time 
in .which ihe State board of education may change the text-
books.'' · 
That Section 133 of the aforesaid Constitution which re-
lates: to school districts, school trustees and the appointment 
of division superintendents of schools is in the following lan-
guage, to-wit: 
''§133. SCfiOOL DISTRICTS; SCHOOL TRUSTEES.-
The supervision of schools in each county and city shall be 
vested in a school board, to be composed of trustees to be. 
selected in the manner for the term and to the number pro-
vide(1 by law. Each magisterial district shall constitute a 
separate school district, unless otherwise provided by law, 
and the magisterial district shall be the basis of representa-
tion on the school board of such county or· city, unless some 
other basis is provided by the general assembly; provided, 
howev.er, that in cities of one hundred and fifty thousand 
or tnore, the school boards of respective cities shall have 
pow~r, subject to the approval of the local legislative bodies 
of said cities, to prescribe the number and boundaries of the 
school districts. . 
There shall be appointed by the school board of boards of 
each school division, one division superintendent of 
page 7 ~ schools, who shall be selected from a list of eligibles 
certified by the State board of education and shall 
hold office for four years.. In the event that the local board 
or boards fail to elect a division superintendent within the 
time prescribed by law, the State board of education shall 
appoint such division superintendent.'' 
~hat Section 649 of the iviichie 's 1936 Code of Virginia 
which relates to division superintendents of schools, their. 
\' ' \ . '·._ . 
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qualifications, appointments, etc., is in the fQllowing I\ ~ 
to-wit: ~' 
''~649. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT.-No one shall 
be eligible for appointment as division superintendent unless 
he meets the minimum qualifications set up by the State Board 
of Education, and in order that an applicant for the posi-
tion of division superintendent may know what qualifications 
are required of him, the State Bo~rd of Education is hereby 
required to publish on the first of February of the year in 
which such election is to take place, a statement showing the 
minimum qualifications for the position of division superin-
(1' tendent of schools, which statement shall be furnished to all 
applicants. The superintendents at present in office shall / 
\ continue therein until their present terms expire.. 
\\} Within sixty days before May first, nineteen hundred and 
thirty-three and every four years thereafter there shall be 
appointed by the school board or boards of each school di-
( vision, one division .superintendent of schools who shall be 
, ~elected f~om a list of eligibles certified by the State Board 
\ of Education and shall hold office for four years. The sai-l ary and conditions of appointment shall conform to section 
,.six hundred and fifteen. Any vacancy in the office of diVision 
superintendent shall be filled by the school board or boards 
of the division. In the event that the local school board fails 
to elect a division superintendent within the time· prescribed 
by this section, the State Board of Education shall appoint 
~nch division ·superintendent. 
\Vhere a school division is composed of a city and one or 
more counties, or two or more counties, the school boards com-
·posing the division must meet jointly and a majority vote 
of the members present shall be required to elect a super-
intendent. (Code 624; 1928, pp. 1201, 1202 ; 1930, p. 883 ; 
: 1936, p. 501.) '' 
That it will be observed from the foregoing th~~ it is the 
duty of the aforesaid State Board of Education of the said 
State of Virginia to set up the minimum qualifications for 
division superintendents of schools for the several 
page 8 r school divisions of the said State of· Virginia; that 
no one shall be -~ligible for· appointment or election 
to the position of division superintendent of said school di-
visions unless he meets the said minimum qualifications set 
up by the aforesaid State Board of Education; that in order 
for an applicant for the said positions of division super-
intendent of schools to know what qualifications are required 
of him, the aforesaid State Board of Education is required 
_/ 
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to publish on the first o{ Febru.;;try of the year in which auch 
appointment or election is to take place, a statement showing 
the said minimum qualifications for the aforesaid position 
which said statement shall be furni~hed to all applicants for 
the aforesaid po§itions, 
That heretofore, tQ-wit: on the 4th day of December, 1931, 
the aforesaid State Board of Education, pursuant to the 
aforesaid provisions of the aforesaid Constitution and Stat1.1t~ 
La,v of the said State of Virginia, set up the minimum quali~ 
:fications for the pqsition of d~vision superintendents of schools 
of the said sevei·al school divisions as follows., to,.. wit: 
·'Whereas, the task o£ the division superintendent is he .. 
coming more and more one which demands technical and pro" 
fessional training; and 
Whereas, the pre~ent list of eligibles is const~ntly inGreaa .. 
ing to such a.n extent as to indiGate that the roquirement$ are 
not high enough; ~nd · 
Whereas, it seems advisable to seleGt OlJly the best pre-
pared individu~.ls for this position, 
Be it resolved that the State Board of Eo;u~ation approve 
the following requirements for eligibility for the position of 
division superintei!dent; 
Be it further resolved that the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction convey these new requirements to those 8tlready 
' on the eligible list and encourage them to take step$ to me~t 
the increased requirements. ---- _: _____ _ 
page 9 ~ Holder of the l\L A. degree or its equivaleUV in ~ 
gradu~te ~tudy, with at least fif .. en seme~. er . ours J 
in professional training·, including courses in Finance and 
) Administration, and three y~ar~ of practical experienc~ as 
! school princ%al or supervisor. 
I e~:ri:~~~ in b~::::!i:~ i~i~~~ b:si~'!~e~d:i!!tiati~!ic:J 
education. 
The colleg·e training or ex:perien~e of the appliQant shall 
\
' have been wi_thin a period 9f ten years from the date of the 
. application for a superintendency, tluless the applicant has 
!, during such time been performing the functions of the s-upm;-. 
intendent. 
1 (Minutes, State Botl.rd of Educa,tion, Dec. 4, 1931. Vol. 
II, Pages 197-198.) '' 
That pursll~Pt to the &foresa,id provisions of the aforesa~d 
Constitutio~ and Statute Law, the &foresaid. State Board of 
Education forwarded.· a ~t8ttement of_!he aforesa~ :rniW,mum 
;1;._~~~1-&.~ ~~j(.J ~ry ..f_o 
~~t-·'-·1-·-Q 
" 
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qualifications, set up as aforesaid, to each applicant for the 
said position. of -division superintendent- ef schools. 
That the aforesaid State :Board· of Education, by resolu-
tion duly- -ad-opted,. instructed the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction of.the said State of Virginia; to notify all persons 
on the then eligible list for. the position of division superin-
tendents of schools~ which said list hacl been pt·epared by the 
afo'J·esaid State Board of Education, prior to the said 4th dO!JJ 
of December, 1931, that they would be ,given ~tntil the first day 
of September, J-9351 to 1neet the new requ,irements. or qualifi-
cations adopted ·and set up by the aforesaid State Board as 
aforesaid which action of the said State Board was as follows, 
to-wit: 
~' Pe.rsons on El·igible·List Under Old Regulations Given Until 
Sept. 1, 1935, to lJtl eet New Requ.irements." 
''The Boat:d by resolution instructed State Superintend-
ent Hall to notify all persons on the eligible list prior to Dec. 
4, 1931, on which date the requirements for eligi-
page 10 ~ bility were revised, that they would be given until 
, · ' September 1, 1935, to meet the new requirements 
adopted by the Board at the Decemb~r~- 1931, meeting. 
~ (Minutes, State Board of Education, lVIarch 30, 1932. Vol. 
~II, Page 50.) ? 
. ~hat the aforesaid Superintendent of Public Instruction 
as aforesaid, cai·ried out the aforesaid resolution, in that he 
forwarded to those on- t~e {hen exist~ng list of eligibles aud 
~o the applicants for the elig}b~e list -for the position of di-
vision ·superintendents of scpools, copies of the aforesaid 
resolution, so they would know· tJ1e minimum qualification.s re-
quired of then1 for said position and to give those then un-
able to meet said mifi~mum qualifications an opportunity to 
qualify themselves for sai~ eligible list. 
· That on; to-w~t: tJle 27th gay of October, 1932, the afol·~­
said State Board of Education, amended, in part, the afore-
said ni~~un1 qualifications for the said position of division 
superintendent of schools which had been set up on the snid 
4th day of December, 1931, as aforesaid, the said amendment 
being as follows, to-wit: · 
"Holder of the master's degree, with at least fifteen semes-
ter hours in professional training, including courses in Fi-
nance and Administration, and three years of practical ex-
perience as school principal or supervisor." 
' Supreme Cou1·t of Appeals of Virginia. 
(Minutes, State Board of Education, Oct. 27, 1932, VoL 
III, Page 180.) 
That notice of the said amendm.ent was likewise given to 
the then division superintendents of schools on said then ex-
isting eligible list and to all applicants for said positions. 
Your petitioners further allege that it will be observed from 
the foregoing that after the aforesaid State Board of Educa-
tion set up the aforesaid minimum qualifications· 
pag·e 11 ~ for the said position of division superintendent of 
schools on the said 4th day of December, 1931, and 
amended the san1e on the said 27th day of October, 1932, as· 
aforesaid, it gave those on its then eligible list who could not 
meet or comply with the above said 1ninimum qualifications 
until the said first day of September, 1935, in which to pre-· 
pare or to equip themselves to be placed on the aforesaid 
eligible list. 
Your petitioners further represent that it is plainly obvious 
that the object and intention of the aforesaid State Board 
of Education in setting up the aforesaid minimum qualifica-
tions or requirements, pursuant to the provisions of the afore-
said Constitution and Statute La,v, as aforesaid, was to in-
crease the efficiency . of the public school system of the said 
State of Virginia, by placing· in the several offices of division 
superintendent of schools in the several school divisions of 
said State, persons who were better qualified, prepared and 
equipped in education, training, experience, finance and ad-
ministration than those who had held such positions prior 
to the setting up or establishment of the aforesaid minhnun1 
qualifications. The san1e is clearly borne out and shown by 
the language in the aforesaid resolutions adopted l;>y the 
aforesaid State Board on the said 4th day of December, 1931, 
and. hereinbefore set forth. It is further borne out by rea· 
son of the action of the aforesaid State Board as is evidenced 
by its minutes of March 30, 1932, already set forth herein-
. above, whereby it specifically directed the Superintendent of 
Puolic Instruction of the said State of Virginia to notify all 
persons on the said eligible list in existence prior· 
page 12 ~ to the said 4th day of December, 1931, that they 
would be given until the said 1st day of September, 
1935, or a]most four years, in which to meet the new require-
Inents or qualifications adopted by the aforesaid State Board 
at its December, 1931, n1eeting. 
Your petitioners further represent that the aforesaid ac-
tions on the part of the aforesaid State Board were clearly 
in accordance with the object, spirit and intent of the afore-
said Statute which in part is as follows: 
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''The superintendents at present in office shall aontinue 
therein until their present terms expire.'' 
The portion of said Statute Law quoted immediately above, 
was a part of the Statute Law as it existed at the time of 
ihe adoption of the aforesaid minimum. qualifications by the 
aforesaid State Board of Education on the said 4th day of 
December, 1931. It is clear therefrom that the General As-
sembly of the said State of Virginia realized that the setting 
up or establishment of said minimum qualifications by the 
aforesaid State Board would preclude some of the then di-
vision superintendents in office from continuing therein· and 
to prevent hasty action from being taken and to give those 
in office, so inclined, an opportunity to prepare and to equip 
themselves to meet the new requirements, qualifications or 
standards that were contemplated and intended to be set up, 
and set up as aforesaid, they were allowed to continue in 
office until their terms expired. 
Your petitioners are advised and further repres~nt that 
the aforesaid State Board, after having set up the aforesaid 
minimun1 qualifications for the position of division 
page 13 ~ superintendent of schools in accordance with and 
pursuant to the provisions of the aforesaid laws 
of the said State of Virginia, and having given notice thereof 
to the then division superintendents and to applicants for said 
positions, as aforesaid, have no legal right to lower the afore-
said minimum qualifications set up a~ aforesaid, without first 
obtaining authority from the said General .Assembly of the 
said State of Virginia to so do. 
Your petitioners further represent that thereafter, to-wit: 
on the 25th day of June, 1936, the aforesaid State Board of 
Education, contrary to the provisions of the aforesaid Con-
stitution and Statute Law of the said State of Virginia, here-
inabove set forth and referred to, and also contrary to the 
aforesaid minimum qualifications set up as aforesaid, took 
the following action, to-wit: 
''In order to emphasize the eligibility of superintendents 
now in office the following minute was entered: 
''Division superintendents now in service shall be consid-
ered to have met the eligibility requirements which were in 
force at the time of the beg·inning of their continuous service, 
and shall not be removed from the list of eligibles because of 
subsequent changes in eligibility requirements which may 
4& Supreme~ Court of Appeals. Qf, Virginia. 
have , been made during the period of their continuous serv-
ice.'' 
(Minutes, State Board of ·Education, June 25, 1936. Vol. 
VII, Page 128.) 
YQur petitioners further represent that such last men· 
tioned action on the part of the aforesaid State Board of 
Education is contrary to the provisions of the aforesaid Con .. 
f:?titution, Statute Law .and minimum requirements set up as 
aforesaid, pursuant thereto, in that it permits applicants fo1~ 
the aforesaid positions who have served as division superin-
tendents of schools and who do not possess the 
page. 14 ~ aforesaid minimum qualifications set up as afore-
. said, to be placed on the aforesaid eligible list, re-
gardless of their actual qualifications and regardless of 
whether or not they met the requirements set up by the afore-
said State Board of Education under the aforesaid provisions 
of the aforesaid Constitution and Statute Law. 
your petitioners further represent that prior to the first 
day of February, 1937, the aforesaid State Board of Educa-
tion. forwarded to the School Board of the said County of· 
Campbell,-V-irginia, a list of persons purporting to be eligible 
for ~lection OO:;appointment to the positio-n of division super-
intendent of schools for the said County· of Campbell, in the 
said State of Virginia, and on said list, the -name of J. J. 
Fray of Gladys, Virginia, appears. 
Your petitioners aver and charge that the said J. J_. ~ray 
has not met and is now unable to meet the aforesaid minimum 
qualifications and requiretnents set up by the aforesaid State 
Board of Education as aforesaid and now in force, which 
said minimum qualifications and requirements were set up 
and' are now. in force and existence undei'l a:nd by· virtue of 
the . aforesaid provisions of the aforesaid Constitution and 
Statute Lawt in that he is not the holder of t~e master's de-
gree, with at least fifteen semester hours in professional train-
ing, including courses in Finance and Administration, and 
three years of practical experience as school principal or su-
pervisor. 
Wherefore, and forasmuch as your petitioners are without 
any other sufficient and adequate remedy, they pray that a 
peremptory writ of mandamus may be issued by this Honor-
able Court, directed to E. Lee Trinkle of Roanoke, Virginia, 
Joseph H .. Saunders of Newport News, Virginia; 
page 15 ~ Rose 1\!IacDonald of Berryville, Virginia; Virginius 
. R. Shackleford of Orange, Virginia; Robert W. 
Daniel of Prince George, Virginia; J. Gordon Bohannon of 
Petersburg, Virginia; Dave E. Satterfield of Richmond, Vir-
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ginia, and Sidriey B. Hall, Superintendent of Public Instruc-
tion, Richmond, Virginia, constituting the aforesaid State 
Board of Education of the said State of Virginia, command- ! 
ing and compelling· them, as the State Board of Education 
of the said State of Virginia, to 1nake up and forward to 
the aforesaid School Board of the said County of Campbell, 
Virginia, a list of those persons who have met the said mini-
mum qualifications that have been set up by the aforesaid 
State Board of Education for appointment. to the position 
of division superintendent of schools for the school· division 
composed of the said County of Campbell, Virginia, in ac-
cordanee with the aforesaid provisions of the aforesaid Con-
stitution and Statute Law, and that the said name of the said 
J. J. Fray be eliminated from said list as one not having 
1net the aforesaid minimum qualifications set up as afore-
sajd, and that all sucl1 other, further and general ·relief be 
granted your petitioners as the nature of their case may re-
quire .. 
page 16} State of Virginia, 
COLEY H. CARWILE, 
C. E. CREWS, . 
J. P. PILI.10W, 
W. B. ANDERSON, 
J .. WHITNEY EVANS, 
Petitioners. 
City of Lynchburg, To-wit: 
This day, Coley H. Carwile, C. E. Crews, J. P. Pillow, 
\V. B. Anderson and J. Whitney Evans, the above-named pe-
titioners, personally appeared before me, Alice L. Younp:er, 
a Notary Public for the City aforesaid, in the State of Vir-
ginia, in my said City, and ·made oath before me that the mat-
ters and things stated and set forth in the foregoing petition 
l{tnrl true and corre.ct to the best of their knowledge, informa-
tion and belief. , 
1\fy comtnission expires on the 5th day of October, 1939. 
Given under my hand this the 18th day of February, 1937 . 
ROYSTON JESTER, JR., 
p. p. 
.ALICE L. YOU.NGER, 
Notary Public. 
. 
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And on the same day, to-wit: At a Circuit Court of the 
City of Richmond held in the Court Room in the City Hall 
there?f, Saturday the 27th day of February, 1937. 
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In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Coley H. Carwile, et als., 
v. 
State Board of Education. 
N. N. Holt, et als., 
v. 
State Board of Education. 
ORDER. 
This day appeared the petitioners in each of the two above-
named causes and filed their respective petitions, duly sworn 
to, and tbe defendants, State Board of Education, appeared 
by Abram P. Staples, Attorney General of Virginia, who 
accepted service of the petitions and notice thereof in each 
case. By consent of the parties these hvo causes are dock-
eted' and are to be heard and determined together and there-
after treated as one cause. 
-.A.nd thereupon, the defendants by the said Attorney Gen-
ernl, desiring further tin1e in which to file a demurrer or an-
swerto the aforesaid petitions, it is ordered that the defend-
ants in each petition file their demurrer or answer within ten 
days from this date, and these causes are thereupon continued 
for hearing until the further order of this court. 
And the court doth adjudge, order and decree that Sid-
ney B. Hall, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Secretary 
of the Board of Education, do forthwith notify the School 
Board of Amherst County and the School Board 
page 18 ~ of Campbell County to defer ~he election of the 
Division Superintendent of Schools for the re-
spective counties aforesaid until these causes are heard and 
disposed of on the merits, or until the further order of this 
court. 
And the Clerk of this court is directed to deliver to the 
said Sidney B. Hall, Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
certified copies of the orders to be by him forwarded to the 
respective school boards in their aforesaid counties. 
And at another day, to-wit: At a Circuit Court of the 
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City of Richmond held in the Court Room in the City Hall 
thereof, Thursday, the 25th day of March, 1937, came the 
defendants by the Attorney General, and pursuant to an or-
der heretofore entered filed their answer, which answer is as 
follows: 
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. In the Circuit Court ~f the City of Richmond. 
Coley H. Carwile, et als., 
v. 
State Board of Education. 
- N. N. Holt, et als., 
v. 
State Board of Education. 
ANSWER. 
'.ro the Honorable Julien Gunn, Judge: 
Your respondents, E. Lee Trinkle, Joseph H. Saunders, 
Rose MacDonald, Virginius R. Shackleford, Robert W. Daniel, 
Gordon Bohannon, Dave E. Satterfield, and Dr. Sidney B. 
Hall, constituting· the State Board of Education of the State 
of Virginia, and the State Board of Education, for answer 
to the petitions exhibited against them in this Honorable Court 
by Coley H. Carwile, et als., and N. N. Holt, et als., or to so 
much of said petitions as your respondents are advised that it 
is material for them to answer, answer and say: 
1. Your respondents admit the correctness of the statutes 
quoted in the petitions, and also admit the correctness of the 
regulations heretofore adopted and promulgated by your re-
spondents with respect to the qualifications of di-
page 20 } vision superintendents,· but your respondents deny 
the conclusions of law and construction placed 
upon said regulations and statutes by the petitioners. 
2. These respondents especially aver that the construction 
placed by the petitioners upon the resolution adopted by the 
Board, instructing the State Superintendent of Education to 
notify all persons on the eligibility list prior to December 4, 
1931, that they would be given until September 1, 1935, to 
·I 
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meet the n~w requirements adopted by the Board at the De~ 
cember, 1931, meeting, is erroneous. This notice was intended 
to be given only to persons who 'vere on the eligibility list, 
but who were not elected and serving as division superin-
tendents. It had no application whatever to persons on the 
eligibility list who were elected and serving as division su-
perintendents of schools. These respondents further state 
as a matter of fact that such notice was not given to those. 
persons who were serving· as division superintendents. 
3. These respondents further deny that notice of the 
amendment in the requirements of .minimum qualifications 
for division superintendents adopted October 27, 1932, were 
sent to division superintendents then in service, and deny 
that said amendment of said requiretnents was intended to· 
have, or did have, any application to those division super-
intendents \Vho ·were then in service. 
4. These respondents aver that it has always been the ad-
ministrative practice and custom of the State Board of· Edu-
cation to construe the general minimum requirements adopted· 
and amended from time to time as not applicable to division 
superintendents actually in service and, on Decem-
page 21 ~ her 5, 1928, Honorable Harris Hart, State Super-
, intendent of Public Instruction, notified division 
superintendents that, even though the specified eligibility re-
quirements should not be met, if their record in office had 
been satisfactory they would be placed upon the eligibility 
list. 
On January 15, 1929, the State Board of ;Education adopted 
a resolution as follows : 
"All division superintendents now in office are hereby de-
clared eligible for reappointment by county and city school 
boards, due to the fact that the State Board of Education 
does not consider that the new requirements for eligibility 
are retroactive. 
· ''The names of all new applicants. for the eligible list were 
considered by the State Board and the list as set up by the 
Superintendent approved. 'The Superintendent was author-
ized to place on this list all those individuals who apply prior 
to February 1, 1929, who meet the requirement.'' 
In accordance with the said resolution, the State Board of 
Education, on March 19, 192.9, approved two lists of eligibles 
as follows: (1) "Incumbents Eligible for Reappointment" 
and (2) "Eligible Applicants for Superintendencies". . 
· The foregoing appears from the n1inutes of the State 
Board of Education ~{arch 19, 1929. It thu~.,~P_!l_!~~_._that, 
- L I /?~ l~ ~--:rr:-·~. ~~ -"'.(... :.0 t)~~ .12-;c Cc.<-•·~(•J>-~'¥ ~ ~--c>-~~-~ ~ ~~-v .A-~-l!J • 
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ever since the adoption by the General Assembly of the pro-
visions in Section 649 of the Code relating to eligibility quali-
fications of division superintendents, the Board has continu-
ously and without exception followed the practice of treating 
continuous service in office as a separate and independent 
eligibility qualification, and has continued to place upon the 
elig·ibility list division superintendents in service 
page 22 } although such persons did not possess certain other 
requirements required of new applicants. 
4. These respondents aver that elections of division su-
perintendents of schools are conducted each four years. Such 
elections were held. in the years 1929 and 1933, and will be 
l1eld again in 1937. On December 4, 1931, which was fifteen' 
months prior to the 1933 election, the State Board of Educa-
tion adopted a reg-ulation, as set out in the petitions of the 
petitioners in this case, raising· the minimum requirement so 
that new applicants should be required to hold an M. A. de-· 
gree or its equivalent. While this regulation did not itself 
contain the provision contained in the resolution of Jan nary 
15, 1.929, rend~ring elig·ible all division superintendents hold-
ing office, it was considered by the State Board of Educa .. 
tion that the two resolutions should be considered together 
and that the regulation of December 4, 1931, was not intended 
to apply to. division superintendents then in office. Accord-
jng-ly, when the ~tate Board of Education prepared the list 
of those eligible for election as division superintendents in 
the year 1933, the names of desirable division superintend-
ents then in service were placed on said elig-ible list regard-
less of whether or not such division superintendents possessed 
an M. A. degree as required by the regulation of December 
4, 1931. 
5. These respondents further aver that the resolution of 
the Board adopted March 30, 1932, requiring notice to be given 
to all persons on the eligible list. prior to December 4, 1931, 
that they would be given until September 1, 1935, to meet 
the new requirements adopted by the Board at the December, 
1931, meeting, had no application to division su-
page 23 } perintendents actually in service, but was intended 
to apply only to persons on the eligible list who 
had not been elected division superintendents. 
On October 27, 1932,- the State Board of Education, by a 
resolution, amended the December, 1931, requirement .by 
striking out from the first paragraph the words ''or its equiva-
lent in graduate study'', thus leaving the requirement that 
the applicant must be the holder of a Master's degree. 
On 1\iay 23, 1935, the following minute was entered upon 
the minute book of the State Board of Education: 
Supreme Cou1·t of Appeals of Virginia. 
''A ntling of the Board was requested regarding the status 
of jo.1·me'r superintendents who do not meet the recent re-
quirements for the eligible list. It was the sense of the Board 
that individuals who are not now serving as superintendents 
will pe expected to meet the new requirements before being 
placed on the eligible list.'' 
It is clear from the foregoing that the Board consid~red 
continuous service an essential requisite to be placed on the 
eligibility list unless the requisites for new applicants were 
complied with. Oil December 14, 1935, the following was en-
tered as a minute upon the minute book of the State Board 
of Education: 
''At a previous meeting the Secretary was requested to 
compile a revised list of eligibles for the position of division 
superintendent. In December, 1931, the Board raised the 
eligibility requirements for the position of division superin-
tendent, and all persons at that tin1e on such list were given 
until Sept. 1, 1935, in which to comply with. the revised re-
quirements. The following list submitted contains all those 
who have qualified under the new requirements, _includ!!!gjy.-
cumbents, who; by reason of their tenure, are pJ.a:cecron thj 
list.'' ---
I 
On J nne 25, 1936, some question having been 
page 24 ~ raised as to whether or not division superintendents 
in service 'vere in a separate classification as to 
eligibility for reelection, the Board entered upon its minute 
book the following: 
"Division superintendents now in service shall be consid-
ered to have met the eligibility requirements which were in 
force at the time of the beginning of their continuous service, 
and shall not be removed from the list of eligibles because 
of subsequent changes in eligibility requirements which may 
have been made duri1ig the period .of their continuous serv-
ice." 
6. These respondents further aver th:~.t on February 18. 
1937, in order to further clarify the interpretation which had 
been placed and is being placed by the State Board of Edu-
cation upon its regulations, a resolution was adopted as fol-
lows: 
v. 
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''Whereas, some question has been raised as to the eligibility 
of certain division superintendents no'v in office; and 
''Whereas, in fixing eligibility qualifications the incum-
bency of superintendents has uniformly and always been ac-
cepted as qualifying such superintendents; and, 
v ''Whereas, this Board did on December 14, 1935, adopt a 
resolution and made a statement showing the minimum quali-
fications for the position of division superintendent of schools, 
a part of which minutes and resolution applicable to the ques-
tion now und~r consideration is, as f?llows: 
" 'In order to emphasize the eligibility of superintendents 
now in office, the following minute was entered: 
( '' 'Division superintendents now in service shall be con-\ sidered to have met the eligibility requirements which were in 
1 force at the time of the beginning of their continuous service, 
\ 
and shall not be removed from the list of eligibles because 
of subsequent changes in eligibility requirements which may 
have been made during the period of their continuous serv- . 
ice.' -
· ''Resolved, that .it was the intent and purpose 
page 25 ~ of this Board by its said resolution to make di-
vision superintendents then in service- on Decem-
ber 14, 1935, eligible, and such incumbency a separate and in-
dependent eligibility qualification and a fulfillment of all 
qualifications required of such division superintendents in or-
der to be placed on the list of eligibles ; and, 
''Resolved further, that in the opinion of this Board, espe-
cially in the light of twenty years or more of uniform eligi-
bility qualifications as to superintendents in office, the said 
resolution of December 14, 1935, was intended to· and did ex-
press the intent and purpose as hereinabove set forth.'' 
7. These respondents furtlier aver that, pursuant to the 
said regulations and requirements heretofore adopted from 
time to time by the State Board of Educatiqn, on February 
1, 1937, the State Board of Education did adopt a list of per-
sons eligible to appointment as division superintendents of 
schools in the various counties and cities of the State of Vir-
ginia, and did place upon said list containing over one hun-
dred names the names of at least :fifty-six division superin-
tendents then in service, none of whom was a holder of the 
Master's degree required of new applicants, and included in 
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the names -of W .. D. Cox, of Amherst county, and John J. 
Fray, of Campbell county. 
8. These respondents further aver that, as required by sec-
tion 649 of the Code of Virginia, there was published on the 
first day of February, 1937, a statement showing the minimum 
qualifications for the Division Superintendent of Schools, 
which st-atement was in the follow1ng words and figures: 
page 26 ~ '' 8. The following minimum qualifications for 
the position of division superintendent of schools 
are hereby prescribed : · 
''Holder of the master's degree, with at least fifteen sen1es-
ter hours in professional training·, including courses in Fi-
nance and Administration, and three years of practical experi-
ence as school principal or supervisor. 
''General administrative ability as evidenced by practical 
experience in business or in the business administration of 
education. 
''The college training or experience of the applicant shall 
have been within a: period of ten years from the date of the 
applica~ion for a stiperintend€'ncy, unless the applicant has· 
during such time been perf0t1ning the functions of the su-
perintendent. · 
''Division superintendentEt now in service shall be con-
sidered to have met the eligibility requirements which were 
in force at the time of the beginning of their continuous serv-
ice, and shall not be removed from the list of eligibles because 
of subsequent changes in eligibility requirements which may 
have been made during the period of their continuous serv-
ice." 
9. These respondents aver, therefore, that the two last 
named division superintendents, whose eligibility is being 
challenged in this proceeding, are qualified· for election as 
division superintendents of schools in the .State of Virginia 
by reason of their continuous service in office. The said W. 
D. Cox was appointed division supet:intendent of schools in 
Amherst county in tT uly, 1'925, by the State Board of Educa-
tion, and has ever since that time continued as diVision su-
perintendent _of said county and now holds said office. The 
said John J. Fray was appointed division superintendent of 
schools of Campbell county by the State Board of Education 
in July, 1921 and has continuously served in such 
page 27 ~ office, and is now serving as such division superin-
tendent. 
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And now, having fully answered, these respondents pray 
to be hence· dismissed with their just and lawful costs and 
-charges. 
ABRAM P. STAPLES, 
E. LEE TRINKLE, 
. JOSEPH H. SAUNDERS, 
ROSE lVIAcDONALD, 
VIRGINIUS R. SHACI{LEFORD, 
ROBERT W. DANIEL, 
GORDON BOHANNON, 
DAVE E. SATTER~-,IELD, 
DR. SIDNEY B. HALL, 
SIDNEY B. HALL (Pen), 
By Counsel. 
Attorney General of Virginia and as such counsel 
for the State Board of Education. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, To-Wit: 
This day personally appeared before me l\Iarie Low, a 
Notary Public, in and for the city of Richmond, State of Vir-
ginia, Sidney B. Hall, who made oath before me that the mat-
ters and things set forth in the foregoing answer are true 
and correct to the best of l1is knowledge, information and 
belief. 
Given under my hand this 24th day of March, 1937. 
1vfy Commission Expires Feb. 7, 1939. 
MARIE LOW, 
Notary Public. 
page 28 ~ And at another day to-wit: At a Circuit Court" 
of the City of Richniond held in the Court Room 
in the City Hall thereof, Saturday the 3rd day of April, 1937. 
'Tirginia! 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
N. N. Holt, et als., 
v. 
State Board of Education. 
IN RE: PETITION OF W}I. DEARING COX. 
On the motion of Wm. Dearing Cox, by counsel, leave is 
given him to .file his petition of intervention in this cause 
':\ __ : 
Sd Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia. 
IJraying to be made a party defendant hereto, w~ich petition 
il'l accordingly filed, and it is ordered that the said Wm. Dear-
ing Cox be made· a party defendant hereto, and that this 
cause hereafter proceed against him along 'vith the State 
Bourd of Education as parties defendant. 
page 29 ~ Virginia : 
. In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
N. N. Holt, et als., 
v. 
State Board of Education. 
To the Honorable Julien Gunn, Judge of the Circuit Court 
.of the City of Richmond: 
1. Your petitioner, Wm. Dearing Cox, respectfully shows 
that there is pending in the Circuit Court of the City of Rich-
mond, a petition for a writ of mandamus prayed for by N. 
N. Holt and others against the State Board of Education. 
2. That the said petition prays that a peremptory writ of 
mandamus may be issued by this Honorable Court directed 
to. E. Lee Trinkle, Joseph H. Saunders, Rose McDonald, Vir-
ginius R. Shackleford, Robert W. Daniel, J. Goraon Bohan-
non, Dave E. Satterfield and Sidney B. Hall, Superintendent 
of Public Instruction, constituting· the aforesaid State Board 
of Education of the .State of Virginia, commanding and com-
pelling them, as the State Board of Education of the State 
of Virginia to make up and forward to the School Board of 
the County of .Amherst, Virginia, a list of those persons who 
have met the minimum qualifications that have been set up 
by the aforesaid State Board of Education for appoinhnent 
to the position of Division Superintendent of Schools for the 
School Division composed of the said County of 
page 30 ~ Amherst, Virginia, in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Constitution and Statute ..Law of the 
State of Virginia, and that the said name of Wm. Dearing· Cox, 
.your petitioner, be eliminated and omitted from said list as 
ono not having- met the minimum qualifications set up by said 
State Board of Education. 
3. Your petitioner further avers that the foregoing prayer 
is the sole prayer of the said petition for the peremptory 
writ of mandamus. 
4. Your petitioner avers that he has met the minimum 
qualifications which entitles his name to be included on the 
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list .of eligibles certified by the State Board of Education to 
the School Board of Amherst County, from which list the said 
School Board of Amherst County is to appoint a Divisi-on Su-
perintendent of schools for Amherst County for the term of 
four years beginning July 1, 1937. 
5. That your petitioner is now, and has been since July 
1, 1925, Division Superintendent of schools for Amherst 
County. 
6. That he has an outstanding and a vital interest in the 
matters alleged and charged in the said petition praying for 
a peremptory writ of mandamus, and that the sole purpose 
of the said petition is to remove his name from the said list 
of eligibles and to prevent him from being reappointed as 
said Division Superintendent of schools for Amherst ·County. 
7. That it is fit, just, and proper that he be allowed to in-
tervene in this proceeding and be made a party thereto, that 
he may appear before the Court and defend his rights and 
interest. 
. Wherefore, he prays that he may be allowed to 
page 31 ~ intervene and that by order of Court he may be 
made a party defendant to said petition and al-
lowed to plead thereto. He prays for all other and further 
and general relief as the exigencies of the matters here in~ 
volved may require. 
WM. DEARING COX. 
vVM. IGNCI{LE ALLEN, p. p. 
State of Virginia, 
County of Amherst, To-wit: 
This day personally appeared before me Wm. E. Sandidge, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court ?f Amherst County, Virginia, in 
my said county, Wm. Dear1ng Cox, and made oath to the 
truth of the allegations ·Of the foregoing. petition to the best 
of his knowledge and belief. . 
Given .under my hand this 18th day of March, 1937. 
WM. E. SANDIDGE, Clerk. 
And on the same day, to~ wit: At a Circuit Court of the 
City of Richmond held in the Court Room in the City Hall 
thereof, Saturday the 3rd day of April, 1937. 
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page 32 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Coley H. Carwile, et als., · 
v~ 
State Board -of Education, 
and 
N. N. Holt, et als., 
v~ 
State Board of Education. 
ORDER. 
This day came the Plaintiffs herein, by their Attorneys, 
and came also the defendant by the Attorney General of Vir-
ginia ; pursuant to an order this day entered making William 
Dearing Cox a party defendant hereto, said William Dearing 
Cox by his attorney, ~y leave of Court files his demurrer and 
answer and the defendants by the Attorney General having 
heretofore, filed its answer, and the causes came on to be 
heard, and the court having heard a part of the argument, 
directed the parties herein to present to him their several 
briefs in support thereof, continues the said causes for future 
consideration and determination. 
page 33 } Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
N. N. Holt, et als., 
v. 
State Board of Education and 'Vm. Dearing Cox. 
DEMURRER. 
The said defendant, Wm. Dearing Cox, demurs to the alle-
gatio~s of the said petition in this cause and alleges that they 
are not s·ufficient in law, and for the grounds of his demurrer 
states: 
1. That the petition shows on its face that both under the 
Constitution of Virginia and the Statute laws thereof, the 
State Board of Education is authorized and empowered to 
make all needful rules and regulations for the management 
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and conduct of the schools as the General Assembly may pre .. 
scribe. 
That the General Assembly prescribed by Section 609 of 
the Code: ''The State Board of Education may adopt by laws 
for its own government, and make all needful rules and regu-
lations not inconsistent with law for the management and 
conduct of the schools. Such rules and regulations not in-
consistent with law when published and distributed, shall have 
the force and effect of law until revised, amended or repealed 
by the General Assembly." . 
2. That the petition does not show wherein the rule and 
regulation adopted on June 25, 1936, is inconsistent with law, 
and this respondent avers .that it is consistent with the law 
and that said rule and regulation of June 25) 1936, 
page 34 ~ has never been revised, amended or repealed by 
the General Assembly~ 
3. That the State Board of Education under Section 649, 
of the Code, had until February 1, 1937, as alleged in the pe-
tition, to adopt such rules and regulations not inconsistent 
with law as it sa\v fit as to and governing the qualifications 
of a division superintendent of schools, on which· first day of 
February, 1937, the State Board of Education was required 
to publish a statement showing the minimum qualifications 
for the position of division superintendent of schools. 
That on that day the State Board of Education did publish 
the said qualifications so required, which statement included 
the regulation entered on J nne 25, 1936, that: 
"Division superintendents now in service shall be consid-
ered to haYe tnet the eligibility requirements which were in 
force at the tin1c of the beginning of their continuous service, 
and shall not be removed from the list of eligibles because 
of subsequent changes in eligibility requirements which may 
have been made during· the period of their continuous serv-
ice". 
4. The petition nowhere sets forth or shows wherein this 
regUlation is inconsistent either with the .Statute law <>r Con-
stitution of Virginia; which latter org·an specifically grants 
the right to amend, or change rules or regulations a~ pre-
scribed by law, (Section 132, Third), and the General .Assem .. 
bly of Virginia gave the said State Board of Education until 
February 1, 1937, to adopt and publish a statement of the 
qualifications tequisite for the appointment of a 
page 35 ~ division superintendent by the· School Board of a 
county or division of Virg·inia. 
5. That the Statute hnv prescribes (Section 649) that 
62 Supreme Cou1·t of Appeals of Virginia. 
withi~ sixty.clays before ~Iay 1, 1937, that the County School 
Board of An1herst County shall appoint a division superin-
tendent of schools selected from a list of eligibles certified 
by the State Board of Education. 
That this list of elig·ibles shall be published on February 
1, immediately precPding. 
That the State Board of Education and the School Board 
of Amherst County are different entities, each independent 
the one of the other, each having its orig·in in, and established 
by, the Constitution of Virginia, without the control of either 
over the other, save as the Constitution and laws enacted in 
conformity therewith, 1nake them inter-relate and correlate. 
Neither the Constitution nor the Statute laws in any instance, 
!!'ives the State Board of Education authoritv to command or 
prohibit, or control the division or county school board from, 
or in, electing a division superintendent as the law prescribes. 
It is averred that the State Board of Education is without 
authority or power to change the qualifications, or to publish 
a new or amended list of eligibles, as to division superin-
tendents after February 1, preceding their appointment. 
6. That thP. county or division school board shall sixty 
days before l\iay 1, appoint the division superintendent of 
schools. 
That the State Board of Education neither of its own initia-
tive. nor by order of court under a petition for 
pag-e 36 ~ manda1nus broug·ht ag-ainst the State Board of 
Education, can prohibit the County School Board 
of Amherst County fron1 appointing a division superintendent 
as the Constitution and the law requires and c01nmands, for 
it is a matter in which the State Board of Education has 
neither legal concern or interest after it has performed its 
duty as prescribed under Section 649, of the Code. 
7. It is averred that after February 1st, any proceeding 
relating to the election of a division superintendent prior to 
May 1, of the year of his election, 1937, must be a legal pro-
ceeding to which the said School Board of Amherst County 
must be the party defendant and by due process of law before 
the court, for up to 1\Iay 1, 1937, only the School Board of 
.Amherst County is the sole and only official body charged 
with the selection, election, or appointment of a division su-
perintendent of schools of Amherst County, up to and until 
May 1!1 1937. 
That under the la"T of Virg·inia the School Board of Am-
herst County, created by the Constitution, 1nay sue and be 
sued · · 
8. That the said petition should be dismissed because it 
indirectly seekR an order against the School Board of Am-
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herst County, and an order has been entered thereunder, in-
directly prohibiting t~1e School Board of An1herst County 
from performing a duty required by the laws of Virginia to 
be executed by it, and over which duty of the Amherst County 
School Board the State Board of Education has no authority 
whatever. Yet the petition praying for the peremptory writ 
of mandamus is brought against the State Board of Educa-
tion while the School Board of Amherst County is 
page 37 ~ enjoined. 
9. That this petition should have been instituted 
a·gainst the School Board of Amherst County into whose 
hands after F'ebruary 1, 1937, had absolutely passed the au-
thority, power, and command to elect said division superin-
tendent, and that the petitioners' relief is to seek to have the 
School Board of An1herst County commanded not to appoint, 
and to enjoin them against appointing, a division superin-
tendent of schools for Amherst County, the said State Board 
of Education being wholly without power, authority, or right 
to change its rules and regulations as to the appointment of 
division superintendents after February 1, 1937. 
10. That this court is wholly without authority or juris-
diction to determine such matter. That a proper proceeding 
should be instituted in the Circuit Court of Amherst County 
ag·ainst the School Board of Amherst County, which has sole 
jurisdiction, as nothing that the State Board of Education 
now does can change the laws of Virginia, nor alter the duties 
and requirements thereunder set forth to be performed solely 
bv the School Board of Amherst Countv. 
"'11. The petition for the peremptory writ of mandamus 
does not lie in this case ag·ainst the State Board of E,ducation 
· bP.cause the said State Board in determining the qualifica-
tions and the list of eligibles coming within such qualifications 
was required to exercise a. discretionary power and authority 
and was acting in a judicial capacity. 
12. The writ of mandamus can only issue against an of-
ficer where a merely ministerial duty is to be exercised and 
performed, and the officer has failed to perform it, and such 
writ will not be ordered where the officer. or of-
page 38 } ficers are acting in a semi or or quasi judicial ca-
'pacity. 
WM. KINCI{LE ALLEN, 
P. D .. 
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Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of .the City or Richmond~ 
N. N. Hoit, et als.; 
v. 
State Board of Education~ and Wm. Dearing Cox. 
Your respondent, Wm. Dearing Cox, for his separate an-
swer to the petition exhibited against him and others in the 
Circuit ·Court of the City of Richn1ond, by N. N. Holt and 
otJlers,_ o~ to ~o much of said petition as your respondent is 
advised that it is material for him to answer, answers and 
says: 
. t This respondent. as a pat~t of his answer to the said pe.-
tition; reiterates and incorporates all of the allegations of 
the grounds or his demurret filed in this cause and prays 
that they be read. as a part of this answer just as though tlrey 
were herein set forth itt extenso, verbatim et seriatim. 
2. ';rhis respondent admits the correctness of the statutes 
quoted in the petition, and also admits the correctness of the 
regulations h.eretofore adopted and promulgated 
page 39 ~ by the .s.tate J3oard o~ ~~ucation 'Yith respect to 
the quahfi.catlons of dtV1s1on supermtendents; but 
this respondent denies the conclusions of law and construc-
tion placed upon said regulations and statutes by the peti-
tioners • 
. . 3. T_his respondent especially avers that the construction . 
placed b)' the p~titio1_1ers upon the resolution. adopted by the 
Board1 mstructing the State. ~up~rint.ende~t of Education to nohry all persons on the ehgtb1llty hst pr1or to December 
4, 1931, that they would be given until September 1, 1935, to 
meet the- ~ew requirements adopted by the3 Board at the De-
cember, 1931; meeting, is erroneous. This notice was in-
tended to be given only to persons who wete on the eligibility 
list, but who 'Yere not elected and serving as division superin-
tendents. It had no application whatever to per~ons on the 
eligibility list who were elected and serving· as division su-
perintendent~ of ~chools. This respondent further states as 
a matter or fact that such notice was not given to those per-
sons who were serving as division superintendents. 
4. This respondent further denies that notice of the amend-
ment in the requirements of minimum qualifications for di-
vision superintendents adopted October 27, 1932, were sent 
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to division .superintendents then in service, and denies that 
said amendment of said requirements was intended to have, 
o:r did have, any application to those division superintendents 
1Nho were then in service. 
5. This respondent avers that it has .always been the ad-
zninistrative practice and custom of the State Board of Edu-
cation to construe the general minhnum requirements adopted 
and amended from time to time as not applicable 
page 40 ~ to division superintendents actually in service and, 
on December 5, 1928., Honorable Harris Hart, State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, notified division su-
perintendents that, even thoug·h the specified elgibility re-
quirements should not be met, if their record in office had been 
satisfactory they would be placed upon the eligibility list. On 
January 15, 19·29, the State Board of Education adopted a 
resolution as follows : 
''All division superintendents no'v in office are hereby de-
clared eligible for reappointment by county and city school 
boards, due to the fact that the State Board of Education 
does not consider that the new requirements for eligibility 
are retroactive. 
''The names of all new applicants for the eligibility list 
1\"ere considered by the State Board and the list as set up 
by the Superintendent approved. The Superintendent. was 
authorized to place on this list all those individuals who ap-
ply prior to February 1, 1929, who meet the requirements.'' 
In accordance with the Raid resolution, the State Board 
of Education, on l\{arch 19, 1929, approved t'vo lists of eligi-
bles as follows: (1) "Incumbents Eligible for Reappoint-
ment" and (2) ''Eligible Applicants for Superintendencies". 
The foregoing appears from the minutes of the State Board 
of Education March 19, 1929. It thus appears that, ever since 
the adoption by the General Assen1bly of the provisions in 
section 649 of the Code relating to eligibility qualifications 
of division superintendents, the Board has con-
}Jage 41 ~ tinuously and without exception followed the prac-
tice of treating continuous service in office as a 
separate and independent eligibiHty qualification, and has 
continued to place upon the elig-ibility list division superin-
tendents in service although such persons did not possess cer-
fain other requirements required of new applicants. 
6. This respondent avers that electigns of division superin-
tendents of sehools are condur.ted each four vears. Such 
elections were held in the years 1929 and 1933, and will be held 
agin in 1937. On December 4, 1931, which was fifteen 
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months prior to the 1933 election, the State Board of Educa-
tion adopted a regulation, as set out in the petition of the 
petitioners in this case, raising the minimum requirement 
so that new applicants should be required to hold an M. A. 
degree or its equivalent. vVhile this regulation did not it-
self contain the provision contained in the resolution of J anu-
ary 15, 1929, rendering eligible all division superintendents · 
holding office, it was considered by the State Board of Edu-
cation that the two resolutions should be considered together, 
.and that the regulation of December 4, 1931, was not intended 
to apply to division superintendents then in office. Accord-
ingly, when the State Board of Education prepared the list 
of those eligible for election as division superintendents in the 
year 1933, the notice of desirable division superintendents 
then in service were placed on said eligible list regardless of 
- whether or not such division superintendents possessed an 
~I. A. degree as required by the regulation of December 4, 
1931. 
7. This respondent furthe1· avers that the resolution of 
the Board adopted ~[a;rch 30, 1932, ·requiring no-
page 42 ~ tice to be given to all persons on the eligible list 
prior to December 4, 1931., that they would be . 
given until September 1, 1935, to meet the new requirements 
adopted by the Board at the December, 1931, meeting, had 
no application to· .division superintendents actually in serv-
ice, but was intended to apply only to persons on the eligible 
list who had not been elected division superintendents. 
On October 27,,1932, the State Board of Education, by a 
resolution, amendAd the December, 1931, requirement by 
striking out from the first paragraph the words ''or its 
equivalent in graduate study", thus leaving the requirement 
that the applicant must be the holder of a Master's degree. 
On May 23, 1935, the following minute was entered upon 
the minute book of the State Board of Education: 
''A ruling of the Board was requested regarding· the status 
of former superintendents who do not meet the recent re-
quirements for the eligible list. It was the sense of the Board 
that individuals who are not now serving as superintendents 
will be expected to meet the new requirements before being 
placed on the eligible list.'' 
It is clear from the foregoing that the Board considered 
-continuous service an essential requisite to be placed on the 
eligibility list unless the requisites for new applicants were 
complied with. On December 14, 1925, the following was en-
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tered as a minute upon the minute books of the State .Board 
of Education: 
''At a previous meeting the Secretary was requested to 
· compile a revised list of eligibles for the p·ositiQn 
page 43 } of division superintendent. In December, 1931, the 
Board raised the eligibility requirements for the 
position of division superintendent, and all persons at that 
time on such list were given until Sept. 1, 1935, in which to 
comply with the revised requirements. The following list sub-
mitted contains all those who have qualified under the new 
requirements, including incumbents, who, by reason of their 
tenure, are placed on the list.'' 
On June 25, 1936, some question having been raised as to 
whether or not division superintendents in service were in a 
separate classification as to eligibility for reelection, the 
Board entered upon its n1inute book the following: 
''In order to emphasize the eligibility of superintendents 
uow in office the following minute was entered'': 
"Division superintendents now in service shall be consid-
ered to have met the eligibility requirements which were in 
force at the time of the l1eginning of their continuous service, 
and shall not be removed from the llst of eligibles because of 
subsequent changes in eligibility requirements which may have 
been made during the period of their continuous service.'' 
8. This respondent further avers that on February 18, 
1937, in order to further clarify the interpretation which had 
been placed and is being placed by the State· Board of Edu-
cation upon its regulations, a resolution was adopted as fol-
lows: 
''Whereas, some question has been raised as to the eligi-
bility of certain division superintendents now in 
page 44 } office ; and 
"Whereas, in fixing eligibility qualifications the 
incumbency of superintendents has uniformly and always 
been accepted as qualifying such superintendents; and 
''WhP.reas, this Board did on December 14, 1935, adopt a 
resolution and made a statement showing the minimum quali-
fications for the position of division superintendent of schools, 
a part of which minutes and resolution applicable to the ques-
tion now under consideration is, as follows: · 
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'' 'In order to emphasize the eligibility of superintendents 
now hi office, the following minute was entered: 
. '' 'Division superintendents now in service shall be con-
sidered to have met the eligibility requirements which were 
in force at the time of the beginning of their continuous serv-
ice, and shall not be removed from the list of eligibles be-
cause of subsequent changes in eligibility requirements which 
may have been made during the period of their continuous 
. ' serv1ce. 
''Resolved, that it was the intent and purpose of this Board 
by its said resolution to n1ake division superintendents then 
in service on December 14, 1935, eligible, and such incum--
bency a separate and independent eligibility qualification and 
a ·fulfillment of all qualifications required of such division 
superintendents in order to be placed on the list of eligibles ; 
and 
"Resolved further, that in the opinion of this Board, espe-
cially in the light of twenty years or more of uni-
page 45 ~ form eligibility qualifications as to superintendents 
in office, the said resolution of December·14, 1935, 
was intended to and did express the intent and purpose as 
hereinabove set forth.'' 
9. This respondent further avet·s that, pursuant to the 
said regulations and requirements heretofore adopted from 
time· to time by the State Board of Education, on February 
1, 1937; the State Board of Education did adopt a list of per-
sons eligible to appointment as division superintendents of 
schools in the various counties and cities of the State of Vir-
ginia, and did place upon said list containing over one hundred 
names the names of at least fifty-six division superintendents 
then in service, none of whom was a holder of the Master's 
degree required of new applicants, and included in said ·list-
of persons not holding said ~1 aster's degree was the name of 
W. D. Cox, this respondent, of An1herst County .. 
10. This respondent avers,. therefore, that he, whose eligi-
bility is being challenged in this proceeding, is qualified for 
election and appointment as division superintendent of 
schools for An1herst county, in the State of Virginia, by rea-
son of his continuous service and office. This respondent was 
appointed division superintendent of schools of Amherst 
county beginning July 1, 1925) by the State Board of Ecluca"" 
tion, and has ever sin~e that time been reappointed and con-
tinued as division superintendent of said county, and now 
holds said office. 
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. Wherefore, this respondent, prays that he be 
page 46 } henceforth dismissed with his reasonable costs in 
this behalf expendecl 
WM. DEARING COX. 
\YM. KINCKLE ALLEN, p. d. 
State of Virginia, 
County of Amherst, To-wit: 
This day personally appeared before me, Wm. E. Sandidge, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Amherst County, Virginia, in 
my said County, W m. Dearing Cox, and made oath to the 
truth of the allegations of the foregoing· answer to the best 
of his knowledge and belief. 
Given under my hand this 30th day of March, 1937. 
WM. E. SANDIDGE, Clerk as aloresaid. 
And at au other day, to-wit: .At a Circuit Court of the 
City of Richmond held in the Court R.ooro in the City Hall 
thereof, Saturday the Rlst day of July, 1937. 
page 47 J Virginia: 
In tl1e Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Coley H. Carwile, et al., 
v. 
State Board of Edueation, et al., 
and 
N. N. Holt, et al., 
v . . 
State Board of Education, et al. 
ORDER. 
· This day came again the petitioners, by their respective 
attorneys, in each of the two above named causes, which have 
heretofore been nierged hito one and by consent of parties, 
heard together, and likewise came the defendants, by their at-
torney, and also W. Dearing Cox, by his attorney, who has 
intervened and made hims~lf a party to the petition :filed by 
N. N. Holt and others, and the Court having heretofore heard 
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the cause, . by agreement of counsel on the original petition, 
the demurrer of defendant \V. D. Cox, the separate answer of 
defendant W. D. Cox, the answer of the other defendants, and 
arg·ument of counsel for all interested parties, and having 
maturely considered of its judgment in the matter, the Court 
doth overrule the demurrer filed on behalf of the defendant, 
W. D. Cox, and being of opinion that the prayer 
page 48 ~ of the said petitioners in each of the aforesaid 
cases should be gTanted, doth therefore adjudge 
and order that a peremptory writ of mandamus be awarded 
in the afore~aid cases, directed to the State Board of Educa-
tion of the Con1monwealth of Virginia, commanding and di-
re(•ting the aforesaid State Board to rmnove and strike from 
the list of those eligible to appointment or election as division 
superintendents the names of the said W. Dearing Cox and 
,J .• T. Fray. 
And the said defendants, by their attorney, having inti-
nlateci their intention of applying to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal~ for a writ of error to the judgment of this Court 
herein, it is further ordered that execution of this order shall 
be suspended for a period of sixty days from the date hereof, 
and it appearing that the defendants constitute an agency of 
the Government of the C01nmonwealth of Virginia, it is or-
dered that no bond be required. ' 
Virginia_. 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Coley H. Carwile, et als., N. N. Holt, et als., 
v. 
State Board of Education of Virginia. 
On February 27th, 1937, Coley H. Carwile, et als., citizens 
and taxpapers of Campbell County filed a petition against the 
State Board of Education of Virginia praying for 
page 49 ~ a writ of mandamus. requiring the State Board to 
revise and forward to the school board of Camp-
bell County a list of persons who have met minimum qualifi-
cations for .applicants for appointment to the position of di-
vision superintendent of schools for the said county. 
On the same day there 'vas a like petition filed by N. N. 
Holt, et als., citizens and taxpapers of the county of Amherst, 
against the State Board of Education, containing substan-
tially the allegations .set forth in the petition filed by Coley 
H. Carwile, et als., and praying that the list furnished by the -
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State Board of Education to the school board of Amherst 
county, contained the name of W. D. Cox incumbent superin-
tendent of schools of that county, be revised since the said 
W. D. Cox did not possess the qualifications required by the 
resolution of the State Board of Education promulgated on 
October 27, 1932, Vol. III, page 180 of the minutes of said 
Board. 
On .April 3, 1937, \Villiam Dearing- Cox intervened in this 
cause and filed his petition and thereupon, by consent, filed 
his answer to the cause of N. N. Holt, et als., v. State Board 
of Education, in which he avers that the resolutions of the 
State Board of Education adopted on J\!Iarch 30, 1932, a·nd 
October 27, 1932, respectively, were not applicable to him 
for the reason, as he avers, this notice was intended to pe 
given only to persons 'vho were on the eligibility list, but 
who were not elected and serving as division superintendent, 
and had no application to persons on the eligibility list who 
were elected and then serving as division superin-
page 50 ~ tendent of schools. 
The issue to be determined is whether or not, 
under the powers conferred upon the State Board of Educa-
tion, it can establish and promulgate a standard of eligibility 
for those on the list of applicants for the position of ·school 
superintendent and were not then serving as suchJ and an-
other qualification for those who were then serving as school 
superintendents. 
Section 132 of the Constitution of Virginia, which pre-
scribes the powers and duties of the State Board of Educa-
tion consists in part of the follo'\\ing language, to-wit: 
''132. POWERS AND DUTIES OF STATE BOARD OF ' 
EDUCATION.-The duties and po,vers of the State Board of 
JtJdncat~on shall be as follows: ·· 
First. * * * It shall certify to the local school board or 
boards of each division in the State a list of persons having 
reasonable academic and business qualifications for division 
superintendent of schools, one of whom shall be selected as 
the superintendent of schools for such division by the said 
school board or boards, as provided by section one hundred 
and thirty-three of this constitution. * * * ". 
Section 133 of the Constitution relates to school districts, 
school trustees and the appointment of· division superin-
tendents of schools, contains in part the following language·,. 
to-wH: 
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''Section 133. SCHOOL DISTRICTS; SCHOOL TRUS-
TEES.-The supervision of schools in each county and city 
shall be vested in a school board, ~ * ·~ to be selected etc.'' 
''There ~hall be appointed by the school board 
pag·e 51 ~ or boards of each school division, one division su-
perintendent of schools, who shall be selected from 
a list of eligibles certified by the State Board of Education 
and shall hold office for four years. In the event that the 
local board or boards fail to elect a division superintendent 
within the time prescribed by Jaw, the State Board of Edu-
cation shall appoint such division superintendent.,. 
Section 649 of the ].fichie 's 1936 Code of Virginia which 
relates to division superintendents of schools, their qualifi-
cations, appointments, etc., contains the following language, 
to-wit: · 
''§649. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT.-No one shall 
be eligible for appointment as division superintendent unless 
he meets the minimum qualifications set up by the State Board 
of Education and in order that an applicant for the position 
of division superintendent may know what qualifications are 
required of him, the State Board of Education is hereby re-
quired to publish on the first of February of the year in which 
such election is to take place, a statement showing the mini· 
mum qualifications for the position of division superintend-
ent of schools, which statement shall be furnished to all ap-
plicants. The superintendents at present in office shall con-
tinue therein until their present terms expire. 
Within sixty days before May first, nineteen hundred and 
thirty-three and every four years thereafter there shall be 
appointed b7 the school board or boards of each school di-
VIsion, one division superintendent of schools who 
pag·e 52 ~ shall be selected from a list of eligibles certified by 
the State Board of Education and shall hold office 
for four years. The salary and conditions of appointment 
shall conform to section six hundred and fifteen. Anv va-
cancy in the office of division superintendent shall be fi.ll~d by 
the school board or boards of the division. In the event that 
the local school board fails to elect a division superintendent 
within the time, prescribed by this section, the state ·Board 
of Education shall appoint such division superintendent. 
Where a school division is composed of. a city and one or 
more counties, or two or more countjes, the school boards 
composing the division must meet jointly and a majority vote 
of the members present shall be required to elect a superin-
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tAndent. (Code 624; 1928, pp. 1201, 1202, p. 883; 1936, p. 
501.)" 
In order for an applicant for the position of division su-
perintendent of schools to know 'vhat qualifications are re-
quired of him, the State Board of Education is required to 
publish on the first of February of the year in which such ap-
pointment or election is to take place, a statement showing the 
minimum qualifications for the position of division superin-
tendent, which statement shall be furnished to all applicants 
for the aforesaid position. 
On the 4th day of December, 1931, the State Board of Edu-
cation, pursuant to authority vested in it by the ·constitution ' 
and Statute Laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, pre-
scribed the minimum qualifications for the position of divi-
sion superintendent of schools as follows, to-wit: 
''Whereas, the task of the division superintend-
page 53 r ent is becoming more and more one which demand~S 
technical and professional training; and 
Wl1ereas, the present list of eligibles is constantly in- · 
creasing to such an extent as to indicate that ·the require-
ments are not high enough; and 
Whereas, it seems advisable to select only the best pre-
pared individuals for this position, 
Be it resolved that the State Board of Education approve 
the following requirements for eligibility for the position of 
diVision superintendent r 
Be it further resolved that the Superintendent of Public 
In~truction convey these new requirements to those already 
on the eligible list and encourage them to take steps to meet 
the increased requirements. -
Holder of the M. A. degree or its equivalent in graduate 
study, with at. least fifteen semester hours in professional 
training, including courses in Finance and Administration~ 
and three years of practical experience as school principal 
or supervisor. 
General· administrative ability as evidenced by practical 
experience in business or in tl1e business administration of 
education. 
Tl~P. college training or experience of the applicant shall 
l1ave been within a period of ten years from the date of the 
application for a superintendency, unless the applicant has 
during· such time been performing the functions of ·the su-· 
perintendent . 
. (Minutes, State Board of Education, Dec. 4, 1931, Vol. II, 
Pages 197-198.) '' 
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p~ge 54 ~ On March 30th, 1932, the State Board of Educa-
tion, as shown in Vol. ill~ page 50, adopted the 
following resolution. 
"Persons on Eligible List Under Old Regulations Given 
Until Sept. 1, 1935, to Meet New Requirements" 
''The Board by resolution instructed State Superintendent 
Hall to notify all persons on the eligible list prior to Dec. 4, 
1931, on which date the requirements for eligibility were re-
vis()d, that they would be given until September 1, 1935, to 
n1eet the new requirements adopted by the Board at the De-
cenlber 1931 meeting." 
On October 27, 1932, the State Board of Education amended 
in part the immediate foregoing resolution of J\!Iarch 30th, 
1932, to read as follows: 
"Holder of the master's degree, with at least fifteen 
semester hours in professional training, including courses 
in Finance and Administration, and three years of practical 
experience as school principal or supervisor." 
Notice of the two foregoing resolutions was given to the 
then division superintendents of schools ou the existing 
eligible list and to all applicants for the position of division 
superintendent of schools so that those who were not quali-
fied to be placed upon the eligible list would be given until 
September 1, 1935, to meet the ne'v requirements adopted by 
the State B·oard of Education. 
On June 25th, 1936, as shown in Vol. III, page 128 of the 
Minutes of the Board, the following resolution was adopted 
by the Board. 
''In order to emphasize the eligibility of superintendents 
now in office, the follo,ving minute was entered: 
page 55 ~ Division superintendents now in service shall.be 
considered to have met tl1e eligibility requirements 
which were in force at the time of the beginning of their con-
tinuous service, and shall not be removed from the list of 
eligibles because of subsequent changes in eligibility require-
ments whicl1 may have been made during the period of their 
continuous service.'' 
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It is alleged in the said petition that prior to the first day 
of February, 1937, the State Board of Education transmitted 
to the school board of the counties of ·Campbell and Amherst 
a list of persons purporting to be eligible for election or ap-
pointment to the position of division superintendents of 
schools for the said counties of Campbell and Amherst, and 
on those lists there appeared the names of J. J. Fray, of 
Gladys, Virginia, and W. D. Cox of Amherst, Virginia, the 
incumbent superintendents of schools for those counties, re· 
spectively, and that they had not met and are no'v unable to 
meet the minimum qualifications and requirements set up by 
the State Board of Education, in that they are not the holders 
of the master's degree, with at least fifteen semester hours 
in professional. training, including courses in Finance and 
Administration, and three years of practical experience as 
school principals or supervisors. 
It has been uniformlv held that mandamus will lie at the ( 
suit of a private individual, although the latter is without any 
special or pecuniary interest which is affected, to enforce a 
public ministerial duty imposed by Statute. (Citing Hwr-
rison v. Barksdale, 127 Va., 180.) . 
page 56 ~ I am of the opinion that the acts herein com- \ 
plained of are purely ministerial and the suit for 
mandamus is properly brought. . . . , 
Section 132 of the Constitution pro'claihled by the con~n­
tion June 6, 1902, and became operative July 10, 1902, pro-
vided that the State Board of Education shall, subject to con-
firmation of the Senate, appoint, for each school division one 
8nperintendent of schools. 
By the Constitutional revision of 1928, Section 132 of the 
Constitution was changed, taking away from the Board of 
Public .Instruction the power to appoin~ division superin-
tendents by providing "It sl1a1I certify to the local school 
board or boards of each division of this State, a list of persons 
having reasonable academic and business qualifications for 
division superintendent of schools, one of whom shall be se-
lected as the superintendent of schools for su~h division by. 
the said school board or boards, ·as provided by Section 133 
of· this Constitution.'' 
Pursuant to that constitutioiuil mandate, the General As-
sembly, under Section 649 of the Code provided ''No one shall 
be eligible for appointment as division superintendent unless 
he meets the minimum qualifications set up by the State Board 
of Education, • * *. The superintendents at present in office 
shall continue therein until their present terms expire. (Italics' 
added.) 
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. . It is clear that the General Assembly intended that when 
the State Board of Education did promulgate minimum quali-
fications as a basis of eligibility for appointments 
page 57 ~ they should apply to all. superintendents and not 
to a certain class, as it distinctly said that" No one 
shall be eligible, etc.,'' and for the purpose of taking care of · 
those superintendents then in office who did not possess quali-
fications required by the board's resolutiqns, the act further. 
provided ''The superintendents at present in office, shall con-
tinue therein until their present terms expire.'' Recognizing 
the fact that the term of office of a superintendent was for 
four (4) years on]y and at the expiration of that period, a 
vacancy occurred and this vacancy occurred in every school 
district within the Commonwealth at the same time, and for ap-
pointment to fill those vacancies for another four ( 4) year 
term, there had to be selected from a list, applicants who 
could meP.t the minimum qualifications set up by the State 
Board of Education. This was recog·nized by the State Board 
of Education and that construction placed upon the statute 
by it,· because on March 30, 1932, it adopted the resolution 
reading as follows : 
''The Board by resoiution instructed State Superintendent 
Hall to notify all persons on the eligible list prior to Decem .. 
her 4,1931, on, which date the requirements for eligibility were 
revised, that they would be given until .September 1, 1935, to 
meet the new requirements adopted by the Board at the De-
cember, 1931 meeting.'' 
In the resolution of December, 1931, the State Board of 
Education recognized the necessity of raising the standard 
of eligibility of the superintendents of schools .of th~ Com-
monwealth declared that ''The task of the division 
page 58 ~ superintendent if; becoming more and ·more one 
which demands technical and professional training, 
and the present list of eligibles is constantly increasing to 
such an· extent as to indicate that the requirements are not 
high enough, and it seems advisable to select only the best 
prepared indiViduals for this position, • • ,. and that the Su-
perintendent of Public Instruction convey these new require-
ments to those already on the eligible list and encourage 
them to take steps to meet the increased requirements''· 
This shows that the Board intended to have a fixed stand-
ard of scholastic education and training for all superintend-
ents in the Commonwealth and not to discriminate against 
any county or school division. 
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A·s heretofore stated the Board gave all on the eligible list 
nearly four (4) years in which to qualify themselves to meet 
the requirements of the Board and during that period :fifty-
six ~uperintendents failed· to take advantage of that period 
()f time. 
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the General Assembly; 
in enacting Section 649 of the Code, intended that t.he mini-
mum qualifications set up by the State Board of Education 
should apply to all applicants for app9intment, including the 
superintendents at present in office, because it specifically 
recognized that they came under the minimum requirements 
established by the Board, otherwise the General Assembly 
would not ;have said ''The superintendents at present in of-
fice shall continue therein until their present terms expire,;' 
thereby specifically intending that the minimum require-
ments set up by the Board should be universal and 
}Jage 59 } there should be no exceptions to that standard. If 
this \vere permitted there would be a discrimina-' 
tion against the pupils in certain school districts, because the . 
.Board recognized that the proper standard is the one estab-
lished by it and if those superintendents then in office and 
not possessing the requirements set up by the Board would 
not be eligible but for the fact that they had taken office prior 
to the date of the resolution fixing the miniinum of qualifica-
tions and requiremP-nts. 
Therefore, the prayer of the petitioners should be granted 
and a writ of mandamus issue. An order to that effect will 
he entered upon its presentation. 
~fay 7, 1937. 
JULIEN GUNN, Judge .. 
page 60 } I, "\Valker C. Cottrell, Clerk of the Circuit Court 
of the City of Richn1ond, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of the record, in-
cluding the opinion of the Court, in the combined cases of 
Coley H. Carwile, et als. v. State Board of Education of Vir-
ginia and N. N. Holt, et als. v. State Board of Education of 
Virginia. 
And I further certify that tl1e petitioners herein, through 
their respective attorneys, have been duly notified that the de-
fendant, tl1e Commonwealth of Virginia and the intervening 
petitioner William Dearing Cox, would apply for a transcript 
of the aforesaid record for the purpose of presenting tl1e said 
transcript to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia along 
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with a petition for a writ of error to the judgment of this 
Court. 
Given under my hand this 1st day of September, 1937. 
WALKER C. COTTRELL, Clerk. 
Fee for Transcript $24.00. 
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